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AN ANALYSIS OF REALISTIC DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN VERSUS PARENTS
Raymond C. O'Brien'
I. INTRODUCTION
More often than not, the question presented presupposes the answer.
For instance, in the infamous case of Bowers v. Hardwick,' the Su-
preme Court was asked to decide whether "the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy
and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such
conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time."' Even in the
relative sexual freedom of the post-Grisvold3 era, the answer is quite
obvious: No, the Federal Constitution does not confer on homosexuals
the fundamental right to engage in sodomy, especially since the states
have preemptory jurisdiction over domestic relations;4 since sodomy is
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America School of Law; Visiting Professor
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the due process clause of the Constitution does not
confer on homosexuals the right to engage in sodomy in violation of a state statute which
prohibits any person, homosexual or heterosexual, from engaging in specifically defined conduct).
2. Id. at 190.
3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (initiating protection of sexual con-
duct, albeit for married couples, by holding that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras which, in turn, create zones of privacy to which people are entitled as of right).
Subsequent cases extended this zone of privacy to the sexual conduct of single persons. See.
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohib-
its the state from discriminating between married and single persons in the distribution of con-
traceptives). Bowers should have been the next step in this evolutionary process and should
have extended privacy rights to homosexuals. See Rev. Raymond C. O'Brien, Discrimination;
The Difference With AIDS, 6 J. CONTEiP. HEALTH L & POL'Y 93. 102-106 (1990). Indeed. the
Bowers' dissent took the right of privacy to be the right of "self-definition". Bowers. 478 U.S.
at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). That is, certain decisions in life are so central to the personal
identities of those singled out that no state regulation should be allowed to hinder them. See
LAURENCE TRINE, AM mCAN CONSTrmONAL LAw, 943 (1st ed. 1978).
4. See, eg., Suter v. Artist M. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (refusing to foster and other depen-
dent children the right to bring suits under the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (allow-
ing states to regulate abortions); Ankenbrandt v. Richards. 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (recognizing
domestic-relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction); Barndt v. Bamdt. 580 A.2d 320
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known to transmit AIDS; since homosexual activity is not a fundamen-
tal right;5 and since the Due Process Clause should not be used to
strike down state laws "that may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought.",6 If the question in Bow-
ers had inquired as to the right of a person to be accorded equal pro-
tection of the law in something so fundamental as consensual, non-
injurious sexual conduct in the privacy of his or her home, another
answer may have resulted.7
So too can the question presuppose the answer in the Solomonic
arena of child, parent, and state. For instance, should natural parents
have the right to procreate, raise, and enjoy their children? Surely the
answer is a resounding yes. 8 And so it was in Santosky v. Kramer,9
where the Supreme Court was asked whether "due process requires that
the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evi-
dence" before it "may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of
parents in their natural child."' How could any person justify termi-
nating the rights of a parent in his or her natural child based on any-
thing less than clear and convincing evidence? After all, "[flor the
natural parents . . . the consequence of an erroneous termination is the
unnecessary destruction of their natural family."" And if the state can-
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The majority in Santosky was clearly aware of the need to retain the
federal exception to domestic relations jurisdiction. The Court suggested that it will only inter-
fere with "state answers to domestic relations questions" when there are "clear constitutional
violations." Santosky v. Kramer. 455 U.S. 745, 768 n.18 (1982) (citation omitted).
5. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J.. concurring). "To hold that the act of homo-
sexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of
moral teaching." Id.
6. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
7. The decision in Hardwick was 5-4. A member of the majority, Justice Powell, admitted
during a speech in 1990 that he "probably made a mistake" in his vote. He now thinks that the
Constitution protects the right to engage in homosexual acts. Stuart Taylor, Jr., When Judicial
Flips Aren't Flops, LEGAL TiMES, Dec. 17, 1990, at 23.
8. Note that the major Court decisions regarding sexuality have always placed that sexuality
in the context of reproduction. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman could de-
cide she did not want to beget a child during pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (single persons cannot be denied contraceptives if they wish to avoid begetting a child);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state may not prohibit distribution of contracep-
tive devices to married couples who do not wish to beget a child).
9. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
10. Id. at 747-48. New York State, by allowing for preponderance of the evidence, required
less proof than most other states at the time: thirty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands. required either clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
11. 455 U.S. at 766.
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not initially meet the clear and convincing standard so as to terminate
parental rights the first time, "it always can try once again to cut off
the parents' rights after gathering more or better evidence."'"
The question posed above presents itself in such a way as to evoke
a parent versus state confrontation, presupposing an answer that is
heavily biased in favor of the parent. The question presumes that the
child's best interest subsists within the best interest of the parent. This
presupposition, however, is erroneously over-expansive. It does not
consider the best interest of the child. At the present time, nevertheless,
it is the controlling principle in cases involving efforts by states to
terminate parental rights.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the Santosky presupposi-
tion and demonstrate why it is misdirected. In particular, the Article
posits that the clear and convincing standard adopted by the Court
deprives the child of his or her due process rights. The minimum stan-
dard should be reduced to at least one of preponderance of the evi-
dence. Such a standard would recognize the so-called parental presump-
tion, i.e. the historical preference given to parents, t3 but give greater
recognition to the rights of the child.
This Article examines the due process c,:ncerns of parent and child
from both a legal and a factual perspective. The legal analysis focuses
on the level of proof necessary to terminate parental rights. The factual
study examines the rapidly changing portrait of the American family
and the efforts of individual states to address the alarming increases in
abuse, neglect, and abandonment of children by parents. A synthesis of
these factual and legal perspectives serves to illustrate that the best
interest of the child is not served by adherence to a constitutional stan-
dard that deprives states of their legislative ability to address the signif-
icant domestic relations problems within their borders.
A large part of this Article is devoted to providing a statistical look
at the plight of children in the United States, especially in geographic
areas containing large numbers of single parents and in areas where
poverty and persistent social dysfunction are prevalent.'4 The statistics
12. Id. at 764.
13. See infra part ILA.
14. It would be conjecture, a denial of equal protection, and even racist to presume that thi
family structure is more tenuous in ghettos. cities, and states with higher percentages of minori-
ties, drug use, or poverty. But it would be a denial of due process to ignore the reality that
there are differences among the states and that these differences can most often signal vul=cr-
able children. One constantly predictive difference indicating vulnerable children involves single
parents: "Nearly 75 percent of all American children growing up in single-parent families expe-
19941
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vividly illustrate that it is no longer possible to suggest that the best
interest of each and every child subsists within the parent. Government
reports such as Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children
and Families ("Beyond Rhetoric"),5 which was presented to Congress
in 1991 by the National Commission on Children, provide factual evi-
dence that supports a lowering of the standard of proof necessary to
remove a child from an injurious home. The following excerpts from
Beyond Rhetoric are worth noting at the outset:
Today, one in four children in the United States is raised
by just one parent, usually a divorced or unmarried mother.
Many grow up without the consistent presence of a father in
their lives .... Each year, half a million babies are born to
teenage girls ill prepared to assume the responsibilities of par-
enthood.'
6
Today, children are the poorest Americans. One in five lives
in a family with an income below the poverty level. One in
four infants and toddlers under the age of three is poor. Nearly
13 million children live in poverty, more than 2 million more
than a decade ago. Many of these children are desperately poor;
nearly 5 million live in families with incomes less than half the
rience poverty for some period during their first 10 years, compared to 20 percent of children
in two-parent families. Among children living only with their mothers, sustained poverty for sev-
en or more years is common; among children living with both parents, it is rare." NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILES 83 (1991) (citations omitted) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETORIC].
15. Id. This lengthy report has drawn praise and criticism. In appraising the report, the con-
servative National Review wrote: "In order to achieve a consensus, radically different points of
view had to be accommodated, and so the findings are ludicrously inconsistent." Kate Walsh
O'Beirne, Children's Hour; Report by the National Commission on Children and John D.
Rockefeller IV's Efforts to Promote Legislation to Protect Children, NAT'L REV., July 29. 1991,
at 34. But the conservative Heritage Foundation found elements to praise in that the report
advocates "two-parent families, recognizes the importance of values and morality, endorses
school choice, and acknowledges that what families need is not more government programs, but
to be allowed to keep more of the money they earn." Wade F. Horn, Children and Family in
America: Challenges for the 1990s, 345 THE HERITAGE LECTURES 1, 3-4 (1991) (Lecture pre-
sented at The Heritage Foundation on July 23, 1991). See also David Whitman, Why Children's
Commissions Fail. 111 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.. July 8. 1991, at 20 ("Rockefeller's inten-
tions are admirable, but his gift for prophecy is suspect."); Editorial, Beyond the Pro.Family
Rhetoric, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 1. 1991, at 20 (praising the report's efforts to
focus on the current needs of the family).
16. BEYOND RHETORIC. supra note 14, at 4.
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federal poverty level.' 7
... While the majority of poor children are white, minor-
ity children are much more likely to live in a poor family.
About 44 percent of all black children and more than 36 per-
cent of Hispanic children are poor, compared to fewer than 15
percent of white children.' 8
Today, one in four adolescents in the United States engages
in high-risk behaviors that endanger his or her own health and
well-being and that of others. 9
... [A]pproximately 40 percent of the nation's children
are at risk of school failure.'
The plight of children in America is not entirely the result of pa-
rental neglect, abuse, or abandonment; nor is it entirely the result of a
lack of government funding for programs, racism, drugs, or the media.
Rather, a combination of factors has led to the current situation. While
no single solution will rectify the problems facing America's children,
we must ask ourselves one critical question: Is the law concerned with
the best interest of the child? The Supreme Court's continued adherence
to the parental presumption provides a negative answer.
After giving a brief history of the application of the parental pre-
sumption in our legal system, Part II of this Article examines the best
interest of the child in the context of two Supreme Court cases:
Santosky and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services.21 Each case involved the Due Process Clause," and each in-
17. Md. at 24 (citations omitted).
18. l.
19. Id. at xxvii. Disease and unanticipated pregnancy are two consequences of sexual activity
that result in high-risk to adolescents. "Early sexual activity, pregnancy, and childbearing are
epidemic in this country. Premarital adolescent sexual activity in the United States has been
increasing for at least the last two decades. Currently, just over one-half of unmarried women
age 15 to 19 have engaged in sexual intercourse at least once. By the time they reach age 19,
three-quarters of unmarried women and 86 percent of unmarried men are sexually active." fl at
223 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at xxv. Lack of education is high-risk behavior: "In 1988 high school dropouts were
nearly twice as likely as high school graduates and five times as likely as college graduates to
be unemployed. Students with weak basic academic skills are more than nine times as likely to
have a child out of wedlock and more than twice as likely to be arrested as their academically
successful peers:' d at 185 (citations omitted).
21. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
22. The Court in Santosky regarded the Due Process Clause as demanding a clear and con-
vincing level of proof so as to protect the interest of the parents. "[Alt a parental rights termi-
nation proceeding, a near-equal allocation of risk [preponderance of evidence standard) between
the parents and the State is constitutionally intolerable." Santosky v. Kramer. 455 U.S. 745. 768
19941
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volved a child or children abused by a natural parent over an extended
period of time. The difference between the two cases is in the Court's
approach to the interests of the child or children involved. Santosky was
directed toward the best interest of the parent. DeShaney concerned the
best interest of the child.
Part III of the Article examines the nature of state proceedings
involving the termination of parental rights. After providing a detailed
account of what occurs in such proceedings, the Article suggests that
many state proceedings do not adequately ensure due process protection
for the children involved. This part then demonstrates why a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard would provide children with due process
protection.
Part IV focuses on the legal status of the child within the changing
American family unit. Statistical evidence is offered to show that the
child's interest should be considered separately from that of the parents
in termination proceedings. Part Four also demonstrates how existing
due process analysis supports the best interest of the child. Finally, in
Part V, this Article considers the best interest of the child from a feder-
alist perspective and concludes that federalism justifies state autonomy
in domestic relations matters.23
H. THE LAW OF SANTOSKY AND THE FACTS OF DESHANEY
Santosky v. Kramer24 and DeShaney v. Winnebago Department of
Social Services' serve as useful illustrations of the Supreme Court's
approach to the best interest of the child. Before examining these cases,
however, a brief exposition on the parental presumption is necessary.
(1982). In DeShaney, the Court found that the Due Process Clause offered no remedy to a child
abused by the parent to whom he was constantly and consistently returned so as to protect that
parent's natural rights. "[Nlothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors."
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
23. This Article supports the proposition that each state be allowed to develop its own stan-
dard of proof necessary to terminate parental rights, recognizing that many states will continue
to require a higher standard than preponderance of the evidence. Those states legislating a high-
er standard should then confront the issue of whether that higher standard deprives a child of
his or her constitutional guarantees of due process of law, not whether the lower standard de-
prives a parent of his or her constitutional guarantees of due process.
24. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
25. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
[Vol. 26:1209
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A. The Parental Presumption
The parental presumption is the historical presumption that the
child's best interest is served by his or her remaining in the care and
custody of a natural parent. As early as 1824, Circuit Justice Story
wrote in a child custody decision:
As to the question of the right of the father to have the custody
of his infant child, in a general sense it is true. But this is not
on account of any absolute right of the father, but for the bene-
fit of the infant, the law presuming it to be for his interest to
be under the nurture and care of his natural protector, both for
maintenance and education.2
Numerous cases so hold today.27 The fundamental presumption is that
a child and the natural parent should remain together.'
Beyond Rhetoric supports this presumption:
Parents bear the primary responsibility for meeting their
children's physical, emotional, and intellectual needs and for
providing moral guidance and direction. It is in society's best
interest to support parents in their childbearing roles, to enable
them to fulfill their obligations, and to hold them responsible
for the care and support of their children."
26. United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.D.R.IL 1824) (No. 15,256).
27. See, e-g., P.G. v. W.M.T. (In re D.B.G.). 590 So.2d 329 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (In a
custody determination between a parent and third party, the natural parent will be presumed to
serve the best interest of the child.). Accord Appeal of H.R. (In re Baby Boy C.), 581 A.2d
1141 (D.C. 1990); Rose v. Potts, 577 N.E.2d 811 (1I. App. Ct. 1991); In the matter of the
Marriage of Criqui & Criqui, 798 P.2d 69 (Kan. C. App. 1990); Westphal v. Westphal. 457
N.W.2d 226 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990):
Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1989); Bancroft v. Bancroft, 578 A.2d 114 (Vt.
1990). See also Susan B. Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination of Parental Rights. 19
FAMi. L.Q. 245. 254-55 (1985) (stating that "[c]ourts and commentators generally agree that a
child's best interests are most adequately met when the child is in the custody of his parents").
28. In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C. 1990). For an example of a state statute incorpo-
rating the parental presumption, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West 1991) (In cus-
tody disputes between parents and non-parents, "there shall be a presumption that it is in the
best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent."); see also MiCH. CowI. LAWS §
722.25 (In dispute between parent and agency or third person. "it is presumed that the best
interests of the child are served by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the con-
trary is established by clear and convincing evidence.") (M CI. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(5)
(Callaghan 1992)).
29. BEYOND RHETORtC, supra note 14, at 65.
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Children do best when they have the personal involvement
and material support of a father and a mother and when both
parents fulfill their responsibility to be loving providers.30
Starting in 1923, with its decision in Meyer v. Nebraska,3 the
Court began to take the view that the rights of a parent in his or her
child are embodied in the Constitution itself. Meyer was quickly fol-
lowed by several other cases, each of which involved the authority of a
parent-or a close relative-in a decisional dispute over a child. 2 All
flirted with the notion that such authority could be characterized as
"fundamental. 33
The majority opinion in Santosky v. Kramer incorporated the fun-
damental rights notion of these earlier cases. The Santosky Court stated
that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custo-
dy of their child to the State." 34
There was a time when the parental presumption was considered
more as a trust, with the state being the dominant party and the parent
entrusted with the child only as long as the parent acted in his or her
30. Id. at 66.
31. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Hershkowitz, supra note 27, at 252.
32. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) ("[T]he values of parental direc-
tion of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child resides first in the par-
ents, whose primary function and freedom include preparations for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("[Tlhose
who nurture ... and direct [the child's] destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare [the child] for additional obligations.").
33. Whenever a right is fundamental, it may only be superseded by a state or federal statute
when the government has a compelling interest in the statutory objective. For examples of when
this issue has arisen, Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sheppard v.
Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982). But see Doe v. Sta-
ples, 717 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1033 (1984).
34. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). The nature of this fundamental right,
however, is elusive and difficult to predict. See, e.g., Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas. 438 A.2d 755
(Conn. 1980) (parent's constitutional right must yield when the child's welfare requires custody
to be given to the non-parent); Custody of a Minor. 389 N.E.2d 68 (Mass. 1979) (state may
remove child from parental custody only on a showing of unfitness of the parents); Sorentino v.
Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 378 A.2d 18 (N.J. 1977), affd 391 A.2d 497 (N.J.
1978); Ellerbe v. Hooks, 416 A.2d 512, 514 (Pa. 1980) (parents have a "prima facie right to
custody" which may be forfeited if the child's interests lie in being in the custody of the non-
parent) (citation omitted).
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proper fiduciary capacity." The state's intervention was considered a
"demonstration of the state's benevolence." 36 This attitude was directed
more toward the best interest of the child than the rights of the parent.
Since the early part of the twentieth century when Meyer was decided,
however, the parental presumption has become deeply interwoven in
American jurisprudence.'
Even when the state intervenes on behalf of a child exposed to
abuse, neglect, or surrender, for example, the state does so as a sub-
stitute parent, i.e. a parens patriae3 1 In exercising the power of pa-
rens patriae, courts frequently deny certain rights to children that are other-
wise afforded to adults.39 For example, states do not have to provide
35. In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the courts imposed few limitations
on the state's ability to intervene in the family relationship. See Douglas R. Rendelinea. Parens
Patriae: From Chancery to Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 213-29 (1971). The early
American courts would exercise parens patriae authority in private and public custody disputes.
Since the parent's rights derived from the state, which delegated control over children to their
parents as a trust, failure to discharge faithfully the trust justified state intervention. The lack of
modem constitutional interpretation added to the state's authority, with the state's interest at
least equal to that of the parent.
36. Hershkowitz, supra note 27, at 251-52. State efforts today to remove the child from
abusive parents and place the child in a protective setting are often far from benevolent. "For
many children, foster care, which is intended to protect them from neglect and abuse at the
hands of parents and other family members, becomes an equally cruel form of neglect and
abuse by the state." BEYOND RHErtRIC supra note 14. at 282: see also infra notes 163-73 and
accompanying text. The dissent in Santosky noted the possible harm that can result to children
due to extensive residence in foster care. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 789 n.15 (Rehnquist. J. dissent-
ing).
37. See, e.g., Parham v. .R, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (-The law's concept of the family
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically
it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children."). See also Caban v. Mohammed. 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (Illinois statute violated the Due Process Clause when it provided for the termination
of the parental rights of a father without a determination of his unfitness); Barstad v. Frazier.
348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984) (court relies upon the parental preference theory in sustaining
right of parent to child).
38. See generally Hershkowitz, supra note 27 (providing historical development of the parens
patriae right). Even though minors have been extended greater protection wnder the Constitu-
tion, that protection is often limited by judicial decisions. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
634 (1979) (constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults); see also
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990) ("IT]he constitutional protection against unjus-
tified state intrusion into the process of deciding whether or not to bear a child extends to
pregnant minors as well as adult women."); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health. 497 U.S.
502 (1990) (upholding Ohio's parental notice requirement for minor women seeking an abor-
tion).
39. For a discussion of the patens patriae power, see Michael J. Florio. Note, An Abused
Child's Right to Life Liberty, and Property in the Home: Constitutional Approval of State lnac-
1994] 1217
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minors with a jury trial in delinquency adjudications;4° states may pro-
hibit the sale of pornographic material to children;4' states may deny
minors the right to vote; and states may deny minors the right to marry
without parental consent.42 The justification lies in the "peculiar vulnera-
bility of children., 43 Thus, the "State is entitled to adjust its legal sys-
tem to account for children's vulnerability and their need for con-
cern, ... sympathy, and... paternal attention."
In most cases, the court has the final say, the parent next, and the
child last.4" In Parham v. J.R.,46 for example, the Court invoked the
parental presumption to declare that due process does not require a
"formal or quasi-formal" preconfinement hearing in cases where chil-
dren are committed to institutions by their parents.47 Merely because a
child "balks" at hospitalization does not "diminish the parent's authority
to decide what is best for the child. '48 Parents are generally seen as
acting in the best interest of the child. "Children, by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are
assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and [failing that,
of the state] as parens patriae."
49
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,0 the Court acknowl-
tion, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 175, 178 (1989) ("A child's constitutional rights may be either ex-
panded or restricted according to the state's 'parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting
the welfare of the child."') (citation omitted).
40. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
41. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Supreme Court has also upheld a
statute which prohibited persons from promoting a sexual performance by a child under the age
of 16 even if the performance is not obscene. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
The need to protect the physical and psychological well-being of a child is compelling. See Id.
at 756-57.
42. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982) (sustaining New York's requirement of parental
consent for marriages of persons between 14 and 18).
43. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
44. Id. at 635 (quoting McKeivar v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion)).
45. See generally John D. Goetz, Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger Court: Concern
for the Child But Deference to Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1214 (1985).
46. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
47. Id. at 607.
48. Id. at 604. But see In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286 (Cal. 1977) (California commitment
statute. very similar to the Georgia statute sustained in Parham, was held unconstitutional); In
re J.C.G., 366 A.2d 733 (Hudson County Ct. 1976) (court would not allow mother access to
her daughter's psychiatric records for fear that the mother may seek to have the daughter re-
leased when that would not be in the best interest of the child).
49. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
50. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (Court engaged in a balancing of competing private and public inter-
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edged that the "[s]tate has an urgent interest in the welfare of the
child.' 5' According to dicta in a prior case, the state has an interest in
ensuring that children are safeguarded from abuse which might prevent
their "growth into free and independent well-developed men and citi-
zens."52 Accordingly, the state may require school attendance, com-
pel the vaccination and medical treatment of children, regulate or
prohibit child labor,55 and eventually, may even terminate parental
rights under the state's parens patriae powers.
Parents, on the other hand, have a right to the care, custody, and
management of their children. 56 This encompasses the right to prepare
the child for "additional obligations" and to educate the child. The state
may not compel a child to attend public school when the parent desires
to educate his or her* child in a private school;" nor may the state
compel a child to attend school when the parent chooses to raise the
ests, and held that the Due Process Clause does not require appointment of counsel for the
parent in every case in which parental rights may be terminated).
51. Id at 27. See also In re Ella B.. 285 N.E.2d 288 (1972) (holding that counsel must be
appointed, at least where there is the possibility of imprisonment).
52. Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (concerning the role that parents play
in the education of the child and implying that, while the parental presumption is predominant.
the state has an active responsibility to monitor the child's development).
53. See generally id But see Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205. 213 (1972) (states' interest
in assuring education is subject to accommodation/balancing of parents' religious beliefs): Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (same).
54. See, eg., Jacqueline Y. Parker, Dissolving Family Relations: Termination of Parent.Child
Relations--An Overview, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 555, 569 (1986) (Parental misconduct alone is
not sufficient to justify state intervention without a showing of resultant harm to the child). See
also Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975). a.Fd. 545 F.2d 1137 (8th
Cir. 1976) (Before a state can terminate family relationship, the state must prove physical or
emotional harm to the child.).
55. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (upholding the Massachusetts labor laws as they apply
to children.)
56. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer. 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that "freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18. 27 (1981) (Ti
Court's decisions have "made it plain . . . that a parent's desire for and right to 'the compan-
ionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an important interest that
'undeniably warrants deference and. absent a powerful countervailing interest protection.'")
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)): Stanlk'. 405 U.S. at 651 ("It is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum of respect .. . .' The integrity of the family
unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (quoting
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
57. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (An Oregon statute which required all
children to attend public school held unconstitutional because it infringed on the parental right
to guide the child's education.).
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child in accordance with the parent's religious precepts. 8 The state is
restrained in these types of actions because the legislated activity in-
fringes upon a perceived "fundamental" parental presumption. Thus, a
state may not arbitrarily interfere with the parental presumption merely
because the parent's child-raising techniques do not fulfill the state's
expectations of ideal parenting. Only a "powerful countervailing inter-
est" of the state would justify interference.59
B. Santosky v. Kramer6°
The Court had little trouble acquiescing to the parental presumption
in Santosky v. Kramer, a case involving termination of parental rights
due to abuse and neglect. In November 1973, nine years before the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Santosky, the Commissioner
of the Ulster County, New York, Department of Social Services initiat-
ed a neglect proceeding and removed Tina Apel Santosky from her
home.6' Tina was two-years-old and had suffered numerous injuries
while in the care of her parents: a fractured left femur (treated with a
homemade splint); bruises on the upper arms, forehead, flank, and
spine; and abrasions of the upper leg. 2 The following summer, the
Commissioner removed Tina's brother, John, from the Santosky
home. 63 John was less than one-year-old at the time. He was suffering
from malnutrition, had bruises on the eye and forehead, had cuts and
blisters on his hands and feet, and had multiple pin pricks on his
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (compulsory school attendance law was
unconstitutional as applied to Amish children because such law infringed on the parents' right
to raise their children in accordance with their Amish beliefs).
59. The extent of this "fundamental" right of the parents is unclear, especially in times of
increasing neglect and abuse cases. Nonetheless, see Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645. In Stanley, the
Court held an Illinois dependency statute unconstitutional. Under the statute, children of unwed
fathers became wards of the state upon the death of the mother. The statute presumed that
unwed fathers were unfit to raise their children. Peter Stanley, the unwed father, had lived with
Joan Stanley intermittently for over 18 years. Together they had three children. When Joan
Stanley died, however, Stanley's children were declared wards of the state. Stanley challenged
the statute on equal protection grounds, alleging that the statute treated unwed fathers differently
from married fathers by presuming unmarried fathers were unfit. Id. at 646-48. In ruling the
statute unconstitutional, the Court emphasized the parent's fundamental right to conceive and
raise his or her child and stated that the "private interest here, that of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing inter-
est, protection." Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
60. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
61. Id. at 751.
62. Id. at 781 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
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back.' The Commissioner took the third Santosky child from the hos-
pital three days after he was born and likewise placed him in foster
care. Although Jed Santosky had not suffered physical abuse, his re-
moval was predicated upon the past abuse suffered by Tina and
John.65
For over four and one-half years, the state maintained the children
in foster care66 and, at the same time, diligently engaged in efforts to
rehabilitate their parents. 6 Annie Santosky was offered training from a
mother's aide, a nutritional aide, and a public health nurse. The state
64. Id.
65. Ld. The Commissioner found that "immediate removal [of Jedl was necessary to avoid
imminent danger to his life or health:' Id. at 751. In a removal of this sort, without actual
neglect, abuse or abandonment, the requisite standard for removal is preponderance of the evi-
dence and removal must be based on actual conditions, not conjecture. See Palmore v. SidotL
466 U.S. 429 (1984) (mere conjecture that the child will suffer stigma by being raised in an
interacial household is insufficient as a basis of custody); Johnson v. Johnson. 564 P.2d 71
(Alaska 1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978) (conjecture based on affects of religious
household, without more, is an insufficient basis of custody); Moye v. Maye. 627 P.2d 799
(Idaho 1981) (mere conjecture that an epileptic parent would be unable to care for a child is
not a sufficient ground for a denial of custody).
66. Much of the expense of foster care is bome by the federal government in payments to
the state. "If present trends in out-of-home placement continue, the Congressional Budget Office
projects that the federal government will spend a total of approximately S9.24 billion between
FY 1991 and FY 1996 under Title IV-E to maintain children in foster care." BeVO.ND RHETo-
mic, supra note 14, at 306. Furthermore, the National Commission on Children currently recom-
mends that, "the federal government . .. require all states to extend foster care to youths up to
age 21, conditional on their enrollment in educational or job training programs, and to provide
services to prepare them for independent living" Id. at 302.
67. The approach utilized by the state was one of "tough-minded compassion." Id. at 113.
This approach attempts to strike a balance between the view that abuse arises from a lack of
personal responsibility and moral strength on the part of the parents, and the view that the
problem results from the shortcomings of our social and economic systems. Thus. "iplarents
must be responsible for the health and well-being of their children, but society must enable
them to do the job well. 'l. at 65. Under either a preponderance of the evidence or a clear
and convincing standard, the state must provide sufficient support to the family to allow for
reunification.
Family support programs are recommended for families under stress but showing no symp-
toms of disfunction. These programs have common goals:
First, they attempt to give families the skills and knowledge needed to cope more
effectively with the stresses of contemporary life and to care for and nurture their
children better. In achieving this goal, programs try to build on family strengths and
capacities rather than emphasizing deficits. Second, family support programs are pre-
vention-oriented; that is, they attempt to strengthen families before a crisis occurs.
Third, they offer multi-disciplinary services that recognize and address the diverse and
interrelated needs of families. Finally, family support programs are community-based
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family planning clinic offered counseling.6 The father, John Santosky,
was offered psychiatric treatment and vocational training.69  D e spite
the considerable efforts of the state on their behalf, Annie and John
Santosky refused to avail themselves of the services provided.70 As a
result of the Santoskys' refusal to try to correct the situation that pre-
cipitated the abuse of their children, the state initiated termination pro-
ceedings in 1978.71
By statute, New York permitted the state to terminate parental
rights upon a finding of a "fair preponderance of the evidence" that the
child had been "permanently neglected."72 Termination could occur
only upon certain conditions being met: First, the child must have al-
ready been temporarily removed from the parent's custody and have
been in the custody of the state for at least one year.73 Second, the
state must have made "diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the
parental relationship" with the ultimate goal of reunifying the family.74
68. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 782.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 783.
71. Id. at 780.
72. Id. at 747. At the time the Court rendered its decision, New York was not the only state
using a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in termination proceedings. Id. at 749.
The standards of proof varied from state to state. Id. at 749 n.3. Thirty-five states used a high-
er standard of proof than a "fair preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 749. Thirty states used
the clear and convincing standard; fifteen states (Alaska, California, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Mich-
igan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island. Tennessee, Virginia, West
Virginia and Wisconsin) required the "clear and convincing" standard by statute. Id. at 749 n.3.
Fifteen different states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas. Utah, Washington and Wyoming) plus the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands required the clear and convincing standard by judi-
cial decisions. Id. Two other states, Illinois and New York. required clear and convincing evi-
dence in certain types of parental rights termination proceedings (mental illness or severe child
abuse were grounds for termination), but generally required only a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Id. Two s ates, New Hampshire and Louisiana, required the highest standard of proof:
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. And one state, South Dakota, required a "clear preponderance"
not just a "fair preponderance." Id. All other states used the preponderance of evidence standard.
Id. at 749.
73. Temporary removal of the child could occur in one of two ways. The parents could
surrender the child-as is more often the case--or the Family Court could have ordered removal
based upon a finding of child abuse or neglect. Id. at 776 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Neglect
was the cause of removal in the Santosky case. Id. at 751. In 1973, after several incidents
suggesting parental abuse and neglect, the Commissioner initiated a neglect proceeding and re-
moved Tina from the home. Id. Then, ten months later, the Commissioner procured another
Court order to remove John III from the Home because of similar neglect and abuse problems.
Id. Finally, based on the injuries to the older children, the Commissioner removed Jed from his
parents' custody shortly after his birth. Id.
74. Id. at 779 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The greater the efforts of the state to provide reha-
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Third, the state had to comply with numerous procedural requirements
directed toward the interest of the parents. These included providing
notice of the termination hearing and notice of the permissibility of
retaining counsel. Finally, the state had the burden of proving that the
parents did in fact neglect the child and, because of this neglect, the
child's best interest would be served by termination of parental
rights
75
During the fact-finding hearing, the judge concluded that the state
had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Santosky chil-
dren had been "permanently neglected."' The judge emphasized that
the state had made "diligent efforts" to encourage and strengthen the
parental relationship, but that these efforts were to no avail. 7 Annie
and John Santosky were not capable of providing for the future of their
children in an atmosphere where they could thrive.78 Thus, it would be
in the best interest of the three children to terminate parental rights.
While the children remained in foster care, the parents appealed the
decision of the court, arguing that the statute's preponderance of the
evidence standard violated their due process rights under the federal
Constitution.80 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, af-
firmed the Family Court's ruling, holding that the preponderance of the
evidence standard was "proper and constitutional."'" The standard "rec-
ognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child ... with
those of the natural parents .... 8,' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider the issue of whether use of the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard in termination proceedings violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 3
On March 24, 1982, four years after the initial termination proceed-
ing was initiated, the Court held that the Santosky's had a fundamental
liberty interest in the care and custody of their children,' and that the
bilitative services, the less the characterization of the state as a bully intent on taking the child
from the parents. This is a crucial emphasis.
75. Il at 780.
76. 1L at 747.







84. "[The] freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
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Due Process Clause required the state to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence the existence of permanent neglect before termi-
nating that fundamental liberty interest.
85
The Court ordered a new hearing to determine if sufficient facts
warranted termination under the heightened standard of proof.86 The
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reviewed the evidence
presented using a clear and convincing standard and affirmed the ter-
mination of the Santosky's parental rights.87
By framing the issue in terms of the parents' interest rather than
that of the children, the Santosky Court ignored the factual history of
New York's rehabilitative efforts and the length of time the children
had spent in foster care. Most importantly, the Court failed to pursue a
constitutional analysis that focused on the best interests of the chil-
dren. 8 The focus of the majority opinion was on the due process
rights afforded to the parents of the children. The best interest of the
parents, rather than the best interests of the children, was the predomi-
nant concern. The Court simply acquiesced in the parental presumption.
C. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 9
DeShaney was decided seven years after Santosky. 'The facts of
this case are undeniably tragic."9° Joshua DeShaney was born in 1979.
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 753.
85. The Court added, somewhat sardonically, that "[w]e cannot believe that it would burden
the State unduly to require that its fact-finders have the same factual certainty when terminating
the parent-child relationship as they must have to suspend a driver's license." Id. at 768. See
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 227.1 (McKinney Supp. 1981) (requiring the State to prove traffic
infractions by clear and convincing evidence).
86. Id. at 770.
87. See In re John AA, 89 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1982).
88. The decision in Santosky may have been due to the Court's concern over the result in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981), which
held that due process gives indigent litigants the right to appointed counsel when such litigants
are exposed to deprivation of their physical liberty. Id. at 26-27. When the facts of the case
present a situation where an indigent parent may lose his or her child, the Court held that the
Constitution does not require the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceed-
ing. Id. at 31. Appointment of counsel to represent the child lies within the discretion of the
trial court, subject to appellate review. Id. at 32. Thus, there is the possibility that the State
could amass its forces to deprive an indigent of his or her child without the indigent having an
attorney. The State would be a formidable "bully." See discussion of Lassiter in Santosky, 455
U.S. at 752-70 (indicating a significant reliance upon concern over the loss of appointed counsel
as a matter of right).
89. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
90. Id. at 191.
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In 1980, Joshua's father was awarded custody of his son pursuant to a
divorce. The divorce occurred in Wyoming, and Joshua and his father
moved to Wisconsin soon thereafter. The father entered into a second
marriage, and that, too, ended in divorce.9 During the divorce pro-
ceedings, the second wife complained that the father hit the boy, caus-
ing marks. 2 The father denied the accusations. The state Department
of Social Services did not investigate.
93
In 1983, Joshua was admitted to a local hospital. He had multiple
bruises and abrasions? 4 The examining physician reported suspected
abuse, and Joshua was placed in the temporary custody of the hospital.
A child protection team conducted an investigation, but determined that
there was insufficient evidence of child abuse to retain Joshua in cus-
tody.
95
Joshua was returned to the custody of his father. One month later,
the boy was again treated for suspicious injuries at the hospital emer-
gency room. Again, officials "concluded that there was no basis for
action."96 A social worker began making monthly visits to the
DeShaney home. On one such visit, the social worker noticed suspi-
cious injuries on the boy's head. The social worker also learned that
the boy was not attending preschool. These circumstances were noted in
the file, but the caseworker "did nothing more."97
In late 1983, Joshua was again admitted to the emergency room.
The hospital notified the Department of Social Services that Joshua had
suspicious injuries, but Joshua was sent home. When the social worker
visited Joshua's home on two subsequent occasions, "she was told that
Joshua was too ill to see her."98 Finally,
[i]n March, 1984, Randy DeShaney beat 4-year-old Joshua so
severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma. Emergency
brain surgery revealed a series of hemorrhages caused by trau-
91. Id.
92. let at 192.
93. Id
94. 1&d
95. Id The Team did, however, decide to recommend several measures to protect Joshua.
including enrolling him in a preschool program, providing his father with certain counselling
services, and encouraging his father's girlfriend to move out of the home. Randy DeShaney
entered into a voluntary agreement with DSS in which he promised to cooperate with them in
accomplishing these goals. Id.
96. Id.




matic injuries to the head inflicted over a long period of time.
Joshua did not die, but he suffered brain damage so severe that
he is expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an insti-
tution for the profoundly retarded. 99
Joshua and his mother brought suit against the county, its Depart-
ment of Social Services, and various individuals in the Department. The
complaint alleged that Joshua had been deprived of his liberty without
due process of law, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, because officials failed to intervene to protect him against
a risk of violence at his father's hands of which they knew or should
have known. 0
After a series of lower court proceedings, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari due to the
inconsistent approaches taken by the lower courts in determining
when, if ever, the failure of a state or local governmental entity
or its agents to provide an individual with adequate protective
services constitutes a violation of the individual's due process
rights ... and the importance of the issue to the administration
of state and local governments.
10
The majority found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide a
remedy of redress against the state for the harm that resulted to Joshua,
because the state did not have an affirmative duty under the Fourteenth
Amendment to care for Joshua under the circumstances of the case, The
Court suggested state remedies in tort'o° under "a system of liability
which would place upon the State and its officials the responsibility for
failure to act ... ,,103 The Court concluded that it was up to the
99. Id
100. Id. The District Court granted summary judgement for the county and its officials, and
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id.
101. l (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 203. "It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua against a
danger it concededly played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state tort law
to provide him with adequate protection against that danger." Id. See, e.g., Turner v. District of
Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987) (the issue was whether the District of Columbia and its
officials and agencies may be held liable for the death by starvation of an abused and neglected
child and the malnutrition of another child which resulted, in part, from the alleged negligence
of an agency of the District of Columbia government).
103. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, (1992) (hold-
ing that the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 does not create an
enforceable right on behalf of children in foster care, but nonetheless containing a strong dissent
from Justice Blackmun in which he considers the case a departure from established law):
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states to initiate such a system. "Tihey should not have it thrust upon
them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."''
°4
Throughout its opinion, the majority drew attention to the fact that
"the harm was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua's
father."' ' The Court implied that had the boy been within the physi-
cal custody of the state, redress against the state would have been
available. But since Joshua was at all relevant times in the custody and
control of his father, 1 6 there was no remedy against the state or its
agents under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite the majority's legal analysis, the Court was moved by the
factual dilemma. "Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by
natural sympathy in a case like this to find a way for Joshua and his
mother to receive adequate compensation for the grievous harm inflicted
upon them. ' ("° It is significant that the majority included the grue-
some facts of what happened to the child in its opinion. In so doing,
the Court indicated a willingness to reject the presumption that the
child's best interest subsists within the parent's best interest.
The facts of DeShaney suggest that the best interest of the child is
not always subordinate to the interest of the parent. Joshua's father,
Randy DeShaney, was not dissimilar to many of the single parents with
children today. He was divorced, poor, 3  involved with more than
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 493 US.
1044 (1990) (A public school student who alleged that one of her teachers sexually abused her
throughout high school. may maintain an action against school officials for their indifferent
policies in reporting incidents of abuse).
104. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. Such a federalist notion of respect-and-more for state legisla-
tive enactments, finds resonance in SanrosLy's dissent, also written by Chief Justice Rehnquist:
Such a conclusion [to adopt a preponderance of the evidence test rather than a clear
and convincing one] is well within the province of the state legislatures. It cannot be
said that the New York procedures are unconstitutional simply because a majority of
the Members of the Court disagree with the New York Legislature's weighing of the
interests of the parents and the child in an error-free fact-finding hearing.
Santosky v. Kramer. 455 U.S. 745. 788 n.13 (1982) (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting). This analysis
rests in part on the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. This too is reflected in
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Santosky. "[The Santosky majority] cavalierly rejects the considered
judgment of the New York Legislature in an area traditionally entrusted to state care. The Court
thereby begins, I fear, a trend of federal intervention in state family matters which surely will
stifle creative responses to vexing problems." Id at 791.
105. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
106. Id at 201 r.9.
107. Id. at 202-03.
108. "Poverty rates among young families have almost doubled since the mid-1960s. and mid-
dle-income families report greater difficulty in making ends meet. For perhaps the first time
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one sexual partner, and prone to violence. While being a single parent
is not inherently suspect, this, coupled with other factors such as pov-
erty, often has a problematic effect on parenting. "Research on the
effects of single parenthood confirms that children who grow up with-
out the support and personal involvement of both parents are more
vulnerable to problems throughout childhood and into their adult
lives."' 9 While the research indicates that Joshua DeShaney may have
adapted better in his father-headed household," ° he was six times
more likely to be poor as children who live with both parents, and at
most ages, problems seem to be more pronounced for boys in his situa-
tion than for girls."' The number of single parents is growing rapidly
in the United States." 2
The divorce rate in the United States has quadrupled in the past
three decades: Approximately half of all marriages now end in
divorce. Indeed, the United States has the highest divorce rate
in the world. Even more alarming than the destruction of these
relationships is the high and growing rate of out-of-wedlock
childbearing and its connection with poverty and abuse among
children."
3
"Today, approximately one in four children in this country is born out-
side of marriage, compared to only 1 in 20 in 1960."" There is evi-
since the Great Depression, American children will no longer routinely surpass their parents'
standard of living." BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 14, at 8 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 251.
110. Id. at 253.
111. Id.
112. Today, one in four children in the United States is raised by just one parent, usual-
ly a divorced or unmarried mother. Many grow up without the consistent presence of
a father in their lives. One of every five children lives in a family without a mini-
mally decent income. Many of these families are desperately poor, with incomes less
than half the federal poverty level. Each year, half a million babies are born to teen-
age girls ill prepared to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. Most of these
mothers are unmarried, many have not completed their education, and few have pros-
pects for an economically secure future.
id. at 4.
113. Recent studies affirm the growing poverty rate among children. According to the National
Center for Children in Poverty, a part of Columbia University's School of Public Health,
[bletween 1990 and 1991, the number of poor American children under age 6 rose
from 5.3 million to 5.6 million, the highest recorded, and the poverty rate for chil-
dren under 6 edged up from 23 percent to 24 percent. That is double the poverty
rate for Americans 65 and older and more than double the rate for adults ages 18 to
64.
Don Colburn, Poverty Rate Record Belongs to Children, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1993, at Z5.
114. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 14, at 252. The statistics suggest that, "more than half of
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dence to suggest that laws encourage single parents to remain that way.
At the federal level, for example, there is a 'marriage penalty'
in the tax law; currently, a married couple pays higher taxes
than two single adults with the same income who live together.
At the state level, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, a
public assistance program targeted primarily at single mothers
and their children, is available only on a very restricted basis to
families where the father is present and both parents are unem-
ployed.
115
Thus, laws and entitlement programs seem to favor avoiding the kinds
of social commitments that are proven to engender better child devel-
opment. If these laws do in fact contribute to the presence and en-
largement of single parent families, they can very well contribute to the
kinds of families in which Joshua DeShaney lived when he was brutally
beaten by his father.
More attentive diagnosis by hospital personnel may have indicated
the presence of battered child syndrome," 6 or perhaps more aggres-
sive custody modification on the part of the mother could have changed
the eventual outcome. But the fact remains that Joshua will spend the
rest of his life in an institution as a result of parental abuse, abuse that
is increasingly common, particularly in geographical areas involved With
poverty, drugs or neglect.
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent in DeShaney."7 His
all white children and three-quarters of all black children born in the 1970s and 1980s are
likely to live for some portion of their formative years with only their mothers." Id. at 20.
Furthermore,
Every year, approximately I million teenage girls become pregnant: nearly half of
them give birth. Approximately half of these births are to young women who have
not yet reached their 18th birthday, and most of them occur outside marriage. Until
recently, births to adolescent girls had been declining. In 1986. however, the trend
reversed, and births to girls age 15 to 17 increased for the first time in nearly two
decades. The proportion of teenage births that occur outside marriage has increased
steadily since the early 1970s.
Id at 33 (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. See generally Commonwealth v. Rodgers. 528 A.2d 610 (Pa. Super. CL 1987) (syndrome
is based upon a finding that a child suffers multiple physical injuries, is undernourished, has
poor hygiene, and that the severity and type of injury is inconsistent with the explanation of-
fered by the custodial person); Richard J. Gelles, Child Abuse as Psychopathology: A Sociologi-
cal Critique and Reformulation, 43 AM. J. ORTHoPsYCHIATRY 611-21 (1973) (recommends earli-
er intervention before the child is beaten or killed).
117. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Senv., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989).
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opinion is particularly significant because he wrote the majority opinion
in Santosky, an opinion replete with reference to parental presumptive
rights and the intricacies of the Due Process Clause." 8 This is not
true in DeShaney. Blackmun "would adopt a 'sympathetic' reading, one
which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that
compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging." 't9
While Santosky involved the termination of a parent's rights, and
DeShaney involved a civil rights action against the state and agents of
the state, the crucial shift in Blackmun's analysis from Santosky to
DeShaney suggests Blackmun's recognition of the factual reality of the
child's plight: "Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irrespon-
sible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father . . 1. 0 If there had
been a suit by the state to terminate the rights of Randy DeShaney in
his son Joshua, would Justice Blackmun still demand clear and convinc-
ing proof of the father's neglect and abuse before termination? What if
the law demanded the return of Joshua yet again to his father because
the father partially cooperated with the state in its rehabilitative efforts
and therefore was able to rebut the clear and convincing standard?
Indeed, the evidence of abuse present in DeShaney was not sufficient to
overcome the clear and convincing standard. In order for the state to
have satisfied the clear and convincing standard, Randy DeShaney
would have had to refuse to cooperate with state efforts at rehabilitation
over a long period of time-six months to a year, or perhaps longer.
During this time, what becomes of the child's best interest? This is
the crucial question. If Justice Blackmun were serious in wanting to
avoid the "sterile formalism" of his due process analysis in Santosky,
he would have examined the brutal climate in which many children
Justices Marshall and Brennan also dissented in DeShaney, partly because they interpret the
Constitution as providing a remedy for state inaction as well as action, and mostly because of
the manner in which the majority presented the question. The two justices accuse the majority
of "leading off with a discussion (and rejection) of the idea that the Constitution imposes on
the States an affirmative duty to take basic care of their citizens, [and thus] foreshad-
ows-perhaps even preordains-its conclusion that no duty existed even on the specific
facts. ... Id. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Marshall and Brennan reject such a "stingy
scope." Id. at 207. For them, "if a State cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid
itself, it cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction." Id. Furthermore, "a
State may be found complicit in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused the
harm." d Brennan and Marshall found that complicity on the part of the state should be liti-
gated. The fact that Joshua was harmed at the hands of his father was not dispositive for them.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21, 90.
119. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213.
120. Id.
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exist in America today, and he would recognize that the parent's pre-
sumptive interest and the child's best interest increasingly do not coin-
cide.'2 '
A preponderance of the evidence standard would still allow consid-
eration of the parent's interest, but would at the same time provide the
child with greater due process recognition. Such an approach finds
support in Beyond Rhetoric:
Children need strong, stable, one-to-one relationships with their
parents. When parents are unable or unwilling to provide con-
sistent care and nurturing, children should have an opportunity
to develop stable, trusting relationships with other caring adults.
Accordingly, the Commission encourages states to review their
judicial policies regarding termination of parental rights and take
steps to accelerate7 the adoption process in cases where babies
have been abandoned at birth and where repeated attempts to
reunite older children and their parents have been unsuccessful.
Some commissioners recommend terminating parental rights for
abandoned infants after 90 days, in order to ensure that these
very young children are able to be placed in loving homes and
to begin the process of bonding with their adoptive parents as
early as possible .... The Commission further urges the Na-
tional Conference of Juvenile Court Judges to develop model
statutes and administrative procedures to accelerate the termina-
tion of parental rights in cases where there is little hope of suc-
cessfully reuniting children with their biological families and
adoption is feasible."
The DeShaney majority's suggestion that it was up to the state to
provide remedies for the abuse suffered by Joshua reflects a shift in
attitude on the part of the Court from Santosky to DeShaney. The Court
121. This position would be in direct opposition to the presupposition of the parental pre-
sumption. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
122. BEYOND RHEToRIc, supra note 14. at 304-05. Only one other time does the Report refer
specifically to termination of parental rights. Again. this was in the context of infants and other
young children and the Report again encourages "states to move faster to terminate parental
rights, where appropriate. We recognize, however, that termination or parental rights may not be
in the best interests of all children." I. at 300.01. But children of all ages are incorporated in
the comment: "Until the nation pays substantial attention to building the capacity of communi-
ties to support all families in their childrearing roles and provides an array of supportive servic-
es to those experiencing problems, the existing child welfare system will continue to be little
more than 'an emergency room for troubled families."' d. at 301.
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recognized that the states are the appropriate arenas for resolving family
relations matters. In acknowledging the tragic facts of DeShaney, the
Court may also have finally recognized that states may often have
legitimate reasons to depart from a clear and convincing standard of
proof in proceedings to terminate the rights of parents like Randy
DeShaney.' 3
III. A PORTRAIT OF THE TERMINATION PROCESS
A. The Children
Cases involving the termination of parental rights arise in the con-
text of adoption proceedings or child protection proceedings, the former
usually occasioned by voluntary surrender and the latter resulting from
abandonment or abuse..4 and neglect."2 Adoption by someone other
123. It is unfair to conclude generally that if termination would be granted through preponder-
ance of the evidence, states would seek to "bully" parents into termination. Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 784 n.l1 (1982). To the contrary, states would still be constitutionally mandated
to provide the same kinds of services that were offered to Annie and John Santosky-services
that provide for reunification as quickly as possible. There would have to be a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the parents failed to take advantage of these services, and
this finding would of course be subject to appellate review. The distinctive difference between
the two standards however, is the factual one that the children would suffer less harm and
spend less time in foster care with the lesser of the two levels of proof. The parents would still
be given the presumption, but the children would have greater recognition as possessing indi-
vidual rights.
124. For the difference between abuse and discipline, see State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588 (1886)
(criminal responsibility for abuse arises only when there is infliction of permanent injury or
discipline proceeding from malice).
125. Most state statutes clearly define the grounds for involuntary termination resulting from
abandonment or abuse and neglect. For example, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (1993) enumerates
grounds for involuntary termination as follows:
(a) General Rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated
after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(I) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months im-
mediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental
duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsis-
tence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent.
(3) The parent is the presumptive but not the natural father of the child.
(4) The child is in the custody of an agency, having been found under such
circumstances that the identity or whereabouts of the parent is unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent search and the parent does not claim the child within three
months after the child is found.
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than a biological parent is the anticipated result of termination."
This third party could be a state agency, a foster parent, a distant rela-
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the
parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time.
the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
(6) In the case of a newborn child, the parent knows or has reason to know
of the child's birth, does not reside with the child, has not married the child's other
parent, has failed for a period of four months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition to make reasonable efforts to maintain substantial and continuing contact with
the child and has failed during the same four-month period to provide substantial
financial support for the child.
(7) The parent is the father of a child who was conceived as a result of a
rape.
(b) Other Considerations. - The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall
give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a
parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to sub.
section (a) (1) or (6). the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to reme-
dy the conditions described therein which are rst initiated subsequent to the giving
of notice of the filing of the petition.
ld. (emphasis omitted).
See generally In re N.M.S., 347 A.2d 924 (D.C. 1975) (allowing child to remain wth foster
parents upon finding by the trial court that it was in the child's best interest); ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN. IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN (1985); Robert A. Burt. Forcing Protection on Chil-
dren and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MIClH. L REV. 1259 (1971); Rob.
ert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 599 (1973); Parker.
supra note 54; Michael S. Wald. State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Stan-
dards for Removal of Children From Their Homes. Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L REV. 623 (1976). For a discussion of
the role of an attorney representing a child, see Sarah H. Ramsey. Representation of the Child
in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Decision.Making Capacity. 17 FA.I. LQ. 287
(1983).
126. Adoption is purely a product of statute. The natural parent could surrender the child and
consent to the adoption in accordance with the state statute. See. eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
220(b) (Michie 1993) (all rights of a parent to a child may be relinquished and the parent-child
relationship terminated by a written agreement signed by the adult parent); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
45a-724(a)(1) (1992) (a statutory parent may, by written agreement, give his or her minor child
in adoption). Parental rights may be terminated without consent in states if certain conditions
are met. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532(2) (West 1993) (setting forth specific
instances when consent to adoption is not required, including those cases where a parent willful-
ly abandoned the child); N.Y. DOM. Rn. LAwY § 111(2) (McKinney 1993) (also setting forth
specific instances when consent to adoption is not required, including parental failure to visit the




tive or friend, or, in some cases, a grandparent.' 27
There is an ever-growing number of children entering the system.
Each year there are approximately 1,003,600 cases of child neglect and
675,000 cases of child abuse, resulting in the deaths of 1100 chil-
dren. 2 ' Yearly, almost 160,000 children receive serious injuries as a
result of maltreatment. These injuries include loss of consciousness,
arrested breathing, broken bones, third degree bums, schooling loss, and
loss of special education services. 29 Additionally, 952,600 children
sustain moderate injuries or impairments. These include bruises, depres-
sion, and emotional distress that lasts at least forty-eight hours."'
These numbers are approximate, but it is ascertainable "that in 1989,
2.4 million reports of suspected child maltreatment were filed in the
United States, of which more than 900,000 cases were officially sub-
stantiated."'32 The increase in the number of reports of child abuse in
recent years has been astronomical 
32
"In more than [ninety] percent of the cases the child is victimized
not by a stranger but by a parent, other family member, or friend
known to the child. 1 33 These children are often removed from the
custody of a parent when the parent or another family member is the
cause of the abuse. This separation from siblings, school, community
127. Note that the parental presumption arises only in the context of a parent versus the state
or some third party. The presumption does not arise in the context of a dispute between two
parents; there, the presumption applied in connection with a minor is "primary caretaker pre-
sumption." Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (in a custody dispute be-
tween a natural mother and a natural father, primary caretaker status arises when one of the
parents prepares meals, bathes, disciplines, educates, teaches and arranges for the social agenda
of the child).
128. NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 3-
5 to 3-11 (1988).
129. Id. at 3-10 to 3-11.
130. Id.
131. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL
FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY 15 (1990). These figures do not include
child sexual abuse. Nonetheless, these figures have increased as well. For instance, "from 35.000
reports in 1981 to 100,000 in 1984." CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
BUDGET: FY 1988, AN ANALYSIS OF OUR NATION'S INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN 175 (1987). See
generally Raymond C. O'Brien, Pedophilia: The Legal Predicament of Clergy, 4 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 91 (1988); Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending
Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating That Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1 (1991).
132. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 131, at 175.
133. Id. at 176. The report identifies three groups of children: those abused or neglected,
those in the foster home system already, and those suffering emotional problems. There is over-
lap among the three. Id.
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and traditional support is acutely painful to the child.
B. The Bureaucracy
Once the statutory prerequisites for termination are met, a termina-
tion proceeding can be initiated by filing a petition with the court."
Upon filing, the clerk of the court sets a time and a place for the hear-
ing and provides notice to the interested parties, including the parents
of the child, 3' as well as any legal guardian appointed for the
child."'36 The actual termination hearing almost always consists of two
134. See. eg., ALA. CODE § 26-18-5 (1993) (petition may be filed by public or private li-
censed child-placing agency, a parent, or with permission of the court, any interested party);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (1993) (petition may be filed by any person or agency that
has a legitimate interest in the welfare of the child, including a relative, foster parent, physician,
or child welfare agency); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112 (1988) (petition may be filed by the
Commissioner of Children and Youth Services or, among others, the attorney who represented
the child in the prior commitment proceeding); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13. §§ 1104(4)-(5) (1993)
(petition may be filed by licensed agency or blood relative of the child); FLA. STAT. ch. 39.461
(1993) (petition may be filed by attorney for department or by any person with knowledge of
the facts alleged); IDAHO CODE § 16-2004 (1993) (petition may be filed by authorized agency
or any other person possessing legitimate interest in the matter); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1581(a)
(1992) (petition may be filed by any interested party); Mss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-105(1) (1993)
(petition may be filed by any person, agency, or institution); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:4
(1993) (petition may be filed by an authorized agency or by a guardian or legal custodian of
the child); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.24 (1993) (petition may be filed by guardian of child.
county department of social services, licensed child-placing agency to which the child has been
surrendered for adoption, or any person with whom the child has continuously resided for 2
years); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(A) (1993) (petition may be friled by "[the individual having
custody or standing in loco parentis to the child and who has filed a report of intention to
adopt"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1564 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (petition may be filed by child pro-
tective services agency or any interested party).
Some states mandate that intermediary reports be filed in the court in which the petition
for adoption is initiated. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2533 (1993). which states:
Within six months after filing the report of intention to adopt, the intermediary who
or which arranged the adoption placement of any child under the age of 18 years
shall make a written report under oath to the court in which the petition for adoption
will be filed and shall thereupon forthwith notify in writing the adopting parent or
parents of the fact that the report has been filed and the date thereof.
In some states, such as Pennsylvania. for example, a report of intention to adopt is not
required. The Pennsylvania statute states that "[nlo report shall be required when the child is
the child, grandchild, stepchild, brother or sister of the whole or half blood, or niece or nephew
by blood. marriage or adoption of the person receiving or retaining custody of physical care."
Id. at § 2531(c).
135. While some states mandate that a parent is entitled to counsel by statute in the civil ter-
mination proceeding, there is no constitutional guarantee to counsel as there is in criminal pro-
ceedings under the Sixth Amendment. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.. 452 U.S. 18,
31 (1981). Few jurisdictions provide counsel for children. See. eg.. In re Kapesos. 360 A.2d
174 (Pa. 1976); Ramsey, supra note 125.
136. For statutes providing notice to the guardian of a child, see. eg.. AR. Rev. STAT. ANN.
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phases. 137 First, the court engages in some type of factfinding process
to determine whether the child is in fact abused, dependent, or in some
need of aid.138 Second, a hearing is held to determine if the child's
best interest will be served by terminating parental rights or by provid-
ing for some other alternative.
139
§ 8-535 (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1107(a) (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2357 (1993);
FLA. STAT. ch. 39.462 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 16-2007 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.6
(West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tiL 22, § 4053 (West 1993); MICH. COMp. LAWS §
712A.19b(2) (1992); Ne. REV. STAT. § 43-291 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.060 (1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:7 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29 (Michie 1993); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.29 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(D) (2) (Anderson 1993);
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(b) (regarding voluntary relinquishment) and § 2513(b) (re-
garding involuntary termination) (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.070 (West 1994);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.42 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-313 (1993).
137. At the fact-finding stage the petitioner must prove the existence of one of the statutory
grounds for termination; the disposition stage involves the court's decision as to whether termi-
nation is in the best interest of the child. In re Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (N.C. 1984).
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-11-103 (1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 622-23 (Consol. 1993).
But other states combine the fact-finding and dispositional stage of the proceeding.
Some states, such as Pennsylvania, provide for a fact-finding stage and a separate termi-
nation stage. However, grounds for moving toward termination must be presented at the fact-
finding stage once the child has been adjudicated dependent. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
6301-35 (1994). This is because of statutory requirements that focus on services provided to the
family. See infra note 164.
138. Even though the statutory grounds for termination vary from state to state, the courts'
functions at the fact-finding stage remain similar among the states and the District of Columbia.
The essential element is determining if the petitioner has met the statutory grounds for termina-
tion: neglect, abuse, surrender or the general sense of dependency. See Clemons v. Alabama
Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 474 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (trial court must first
find from clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent; once dependency is found,
court must determine whether less drastic measures than termination of the rights of the parent
would suffice to serve the best interest of the child); ALASKA STAT. § 26-18-7 (1993) (court
must determine at the adjudicatory hearing that there is clear and convincing evidence that the
child is in need of aid); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-602 (West 1994) (court must hold a
separate hearing and determine if sufficient grounds exist for termination); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.467 (West 1994) (court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination exist); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-81 (1993)
(court must determine first whether there is clear and convincing evidence of parental miscon-
duct or inability as defined by the statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.080 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1993) (circuit court shall conduct hearing to make findings of fact); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.19b, annot. I (West 1994) (court must determine that there is clear and convinc-
ing evidence of one of the statutory grounds for termination); NEv. REV. STAT, § 128.090
(1993) (court shall require the petitioner to establish the facts by clear and convincing evi-
dence); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 622 (Consol. 1994) (court will hold a separate factfinding hear-
ing to determine if the allegations are supported by clear and convincing evidence); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-289.30 (1993) (during the adjudication stage of a termination proceeding, court must
determine whether the statutory grounds for termination have been proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.424 (West 1994) (purpose of the fact-finding hearing is to
determine whether grounds exist for termination of parental rights).
139. In Arizona, for instance, the court may either terminate parental rights or dismiss the pc-
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Throughout it all, the state is dependent upon a bureaucratic system
often managed and staffed by poorly-paid, over-worked men and wom-
en."4 For instance,
A nationwide study of salaries in public and private welfare
agencies in 1989 found that social workers with master's de-
grees earned an average of $24,824; those without master's
degrees earned between $18,000 and $19,000. A survey of
public child welfare staff in more than 40 states found that the
median salary for entry-level direct service workers in 1989 was
just above $21,000; for top-level direct service workers, it was
just above $27,000.'
41
It is not surprising therefore, that "[tiurnover in the field is also quite
high. Many experienced social workers leave public service for more
lucrative and less stressful positions in private practice, industrial social
work, and employee assistance programs.' 42
The social workers currently deployed in the child welfare field
"average between 50 and 70 cases at any given time, although some
caseworkers report carrying more than 200 cases simultaneously.:1 43
In addition, because of present budget constraints, many positions are
filled by men and women with little professional education or experi-
ence in child welfare. "Today, only 25 percent of caseworkers provid-
ing direct servicis in the child welfare system have any social work
training; roughly 50 percent have no previous experience working with
children and families or in human service agencies."'" Such deficien-
cies were brought to the attention of the district court in Lashawn A. v.
Dixon.145 The case involved a class action on behalf of children in
foster care in the District of Columbia, and children who, although not
yet in foster care, were the subject of reports of abuse and neglect. The
court found that the foster care system operated by the District of Co-
lumbia did not comply with federal law, District law, or the United
tition and provide for substitution or supplementation of parental cam and supervision, if the
best interests of the child so require. ARIZ. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 8-538 (1994).
140. For an excellent overview of both the historical and current systems of child dependency
actions, see Judith Areen. Intervention Beneen Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases. 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975).
141. BEYOND RHETORIC. supra note 14. at 334.
142. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
144. Id.
145. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
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States Constitution.'" The court described how the system can de-
prive the children:
It is a case about thousands of children who, due to family
financial problems, psychological problems, and substance abuse
problems, among other things, rely on the District to provide
them with food, shelter, and day-to-day care. It is about belea-
guered city employees trying their best to provide these necessi-
ties while plagued with excessive caseloads, staff shortages, and
budgetary constraints. It is about the failure of an ineptly man-
aged child welfare system . . . and the resultant tragedies for
District children relegated to entire childhoods spent in foster
care drift. Unfortunately, it is about a lost generation of children
whose tragic plight is being repeated every day. 47
While some systems are better than others, for those states with systems
similar to the District of Columbia's, the requirement of a clear and
convincing level of proof for termination of parental rights prevents
states from making their systems more responsive to the child's best
interest.
C. Rehabilitation and Reunification
Because termination "operates to extinguish all legal rights between
parent and child," '48 termination will occur only .as a last resort, after
the state has exhausted its statutory prerequisites.'49 Termination pro-
146. Id. at 960-61.
147. Id.
148. See Hershkowitz, supra note 27, at 282. Statutes illustrating the finality of termination
include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (1994) ("An order terminating the parent-child relation-
ship shall divest the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations
with respect to each other ...."). Accord COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-608 (1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1113 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2361 (1993); FLA. STAT. ch. 39.469(2) (b)
(1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-80 (Michie 1993); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 705. para. 2-29
(Smith-Hurd 1994); IND. CODE § 31-6-5-6 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.100
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MINN. STAT. § 260.241 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-611
(1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(m) (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1993);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2521 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN, §
20-7-1576 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (West 1994); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.200 (1993); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-317 (1993). Some states retain the child's rights to
inheritance until a final order of adoption. See, e.g., AMIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (1988 &
Supp. 1991); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-11-108 (1986).
149. Only Massachusetts and Vermont have no statutes providing for termination of parental
rights.
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ceedings arise after the state has taken protective custody over a sur-
rendered, abused or neglected child'50 pursuant to a dependency adju-
dication or care and protection proceeding'5' and then only because
state efforts to rehabilitate the parents and provide for reunification of
the family have failed.'52
State efforts at reunification may employ a myriad of services, but
those described in Beyond Rhetoric are illustrative:
First, they attempt to give families the skills and knowledge
150. Absent visible physical abuse, neglect or dependency is difficult to ascertain. The test
centers on what a reasonably intelligent person should, by common understanding and practice,
realize to be necessary for that particular child. See People in Interest of D.K.. 245 N.W.2d
644, 651 (S.D. 1976) (statute was sustained in its definition of neglect). But see Davis v.
Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37, 43 (Ark. 1979) (statute defining parents as unfit if they were unable to
provide a "proper home" was unconstitutionally vague). For a case dealing with emotional ne-
glect, see Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1982). For a case dealing with potential
neglect, see In re East, 288 N.E.2d 343. 346 (Ohio Misc. 1972) ("The law does not require the
court to experiment with the child's welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.").
151. The state's entry into the family unit is predicated on its parens patrioe authority. Either
surrender of the child or a dependency situation will initiate the state action that eventually
evolves into the petition of termination. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 1991) (courts
may consider a petition to terminate parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the juvenile has been adjudicated dependent-neglected); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-602
(1993) (termination of a parent-child relationship shall be considered only after an adjudication
of a child as dependent or neglected); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-I 12 (West 1994) (court
may grant a petition to terminate after a child has been found to be neglected or uncared for in
a prior proceeding and parent has not been rehabilitated); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-61(b) (1) (E)
(1993) (involuntary termination proceeding will occur after the child has been removed from
parental custody pursuant to judicial proceeding); IND. COD ANN. § 31-6-54 (Burns 1993)
(termination involving child in need of services may occur only after the child has been re-
moved from the parent for at least six months under a dispositional decree); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-C (1990) (court may terminate when parent fails to correct conditions that led to
finding of abuse or neglect); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a) (1994) (parental rights may
be terminated when parent, for period of six months, has demonstrated a settled purpose of
relinquishment or failure to perform parental duties). See generally Hershkowitz. supra note 27.
at 281 ("Proceedings to determine dependency are generally a prerequisite to the termination of
parental rights"); Parker. supra note 54. at 572 (by the time a termination proceeding occurs.
the child has already been removed from his parents' home pursuant to a care and protection
proceeding).
152. The failure of state rehabilitative efforts is the concrete proof necessary to provide for
termination of parental rights. Some state statutes provide for this expressly. See. e.g.. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(d) (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-81(b) (4) (C) (1993); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1583(b) (7) (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2) (c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055(B) (2) (b) (iv) (West 1993); MNN. STAT. ANN. §
260.221(b) (5) (West 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3) (c) (Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-4-28(B) (3) (Michie 1993); N.Y. FAht. Cr. Acr § 614(1) (C) (Consol. 1993); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a) (5) (1994); RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(1) (c) (1993): VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-283(C) (1) (Miche 1994).
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needed to cope more effectively with the stresses of contem-
porary life and to care for and nurture their children better. In
achieving this goal, programs try to build on family strengths
and capacities rather than emphasizing deficits. Second, family
support programs are prevention-oriented; that is, they attempt
to strengthen families before a crisis occurs. Third, they offer
multidisciplinary services that recognize and address the diverse
and interrelated needs of families. Finally, family support pro-
grams are community-based and easily accessible to parents in
order to be as responsive as possible to the families they
serve. 1
53
Such services are an integral part of the termination process. Their
existence rebuts any charge that a state, in initiating a termination pro-
ceeding, is depriving the parent of the child through "bullying ''54 or
coercion. Indeed, when any childcare agency has custody of a child and
brings a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the agency must affir-
matively plead and prove, often by clear and convincing evidence, that
it has fulfilled its statutory duty to exercise diligent efforts to strengthen
the parent-child relationship and reunite the family.1
55
As was noted in Santosky, an integral part of the termination equa-
tion is the scope of the services offered by the state. If the services
designed to bring about termination are not extensive and forthcoming,
153. BEYOND RHErotc, supra note 14, at 275. To control obsessive behavior, parents are
often required to enroll in programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, or
Weight Watchers. Violence clinics or support groups are available to abusive parents and spous-
es. More traditional programs include the following:
[1] parent education and support groups for parents;
[2] activities that bring parents and children together to teach parents about child
development and strengthen the parent-child relationship;
[3] classes and discussion groups on issues of concern to parents, such as family
budgeting, coping with stress, health, and nutrition;
[4] drop in centers, offering unstructured time for families to be with other families
and with program staff on an informal basis;
[5] child care while parents are engaged in activities offered by the family support
program;
[6] information and referral to other services in the community, including child care,
health care, nutrition programs, and counseling services;
[7] home visits, often designed to introduce particularly isolated parents to family
resource programs; and
[8] development exams or health screening for infants and children.
Id. at 275-276.
154. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 784 n.l1 (1982).
155. In re Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (N.Y. 1984).
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the petition for termination cannot succeed. As Justice Rehnquist noted:
A plan for providing petitioners with extensive counseling and
training services was submitted to the court and approved ....
Under the plan, petitioners received training by a mother's aide,
a nutritional aide, and a public health nurse, and counseling at a
family planning clinic. In addition, the plan provided psychiatric
treatment and vocational training for the father, and counseling
at a family service center for the mother.
56
When parents refuse to cooperate with such a plan, the state initiates a
termination proceeding. Such a proceeding cannot, therefore, succeed
under any due process analysis without the state first offering the fami-
ly services to prevent the break-up of the family or to reunite it if the
child has already left home."s
In Maine, for example, before termination of parental rights can
occur, the social service agency must arrange rehabilitative services for
the parents; notify the parents in writing of the child's address when
the child is removed from the home; facilitate visitation between the
natural parents and the child; and discuss with the parents the reasons
for the child's removal from the home and the improvements which
must be made before the child is returned."5 8
State requirements on time limits for rehabilitation vary. Some
impose a time limit as a prerequisite before parental rights can be ter-
minated. Others require that the child be in the care of an authorized
agency for at least one year following the initial adjudication of depen-
dency before termination may be initiated.' 9 Statutes with mandated
time periods that are not associated with the conduct of the state or
with the response of the parents may be invalid as unduly adverse to
the best interests of the child under any due process analysis, since the
child is most often confined to a foster care facility or an abusive home
156. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 784 n.11.
158. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tiL 22, § 4041 (West 1993).
159. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B) (6) (1988); ARE. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341(b)
(1) (Michie 1987); CAt. FAKi CODE § 7828 (Deering 1994); DEL CODE ANN. ti. 13. §
1103(5) (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-61(b) (1) (C) (1988); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-
b(7) (a) (ConsoL 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(3) (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147
(1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C) (Michie 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(2) (c) (%Vest
1988). Generally, states require one year. but some do not. See. e.g.. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2354(b) (1989) (six months); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130A(3) (West 1991) (imposes a
three month period); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23. § 2511(a) (5) (1985) (six months); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-1572(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (six months).
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during this period.' 6 Nonetheless, the time periods are meant to add
caution to a procedure that seeks to balance the best interests of the
child with the parental presumption.
D. The Problems with Foster Care
Sometimes the victimized child is placed in the custody of a rela-
tive while his or her parents undergo rehabilitation. More often than
not, however, the child is placed in foster care. During a termination
proceeding, foster care can approximate actual abuse in its injurious
effect upon a child.'1
6
"Foster care is intended to protect children from neglect and abuse
at the hands of parents and other family members, yet all too often it
becomes an equally cruel form of neglect and abuse by the state."' 62
The number of children in foster care has increased dramatically since
early declines in the late 1970s and early 1980s. "Recent estimates pro-
ject that more than half a million children will be in foster care by 1995.''
160. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), which concerned the validity of a state dura-
tional residency requirement for divorce. While the Court sustained the one-year requirement
because it was a domestic relations issue and it satisfied the state's need to provide substance
to its decrees, id. at 396, the dissent lamented the deprivation such statutes cause. id. at 418-27.
Residence within an injurious environment is sufficient deprivation to warrant close scrutiny of
these statutes.
161. [S]ome children linger in foster care or in institutions for extended periods of time;
an estimated 14 percent of foster children stay in the system five or more years. De-
spite widespread knowledge that children do best in settings that provide continuity
and stable, caring relationships with adults, they are often moved from one placement
to another. Approximately 55 percent of children in foster care experience two or
more placements; 8 percent experience six or more placements, in part because there
are too few foster parents trained and willing to care for troubled children and chil-
dren with special needs. In addition, foster children rarely have just one caseworker
who tracks their case and monitors their progress. High rates of turnover among case-
workers make it difficult for children to receive continuous personal attention and
may amplify their feelings of being lost in an uncaring system.
BEYOND RHETRIC, supra note 14, at 287-88 (citations omitted).
162. Id. at xxx.
163. Id. This high number reflects a reversal of the trend which saw a decline earlier. "In
1977 an estimated 502,000 children were in foster care. By 1980 this number had dropped to
302,000, and it declined further to a low of 275.000 in 1983." Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted).
In addition to foster care, "an estimated 91,646 children live in public and private juvenile
justice facilities, and another 54,472 receive mental health care as inpatients in hospitals and
residential treatment centers." Id. at 284 (citations omitted). The increase could be the result of
the continued break-up of the family structure, single parent births, homelessness, the continuing
recession, drugs, increased reporting requirements, or a pattern of government funding programs
that actually provide open-ended out-of-home entitlement, while restricting in-home funds. See Id.
at xxx-xxxi (citing entitlement under Title IV-E of the Child Welfare and Adoption Assistance
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Time in foster care is the crucial issue. In cases involving a petition
for temporary removal of custody or a petition for permanent termina-
tion of parental rights, the state often imposes a time period during
which reunification of the family unit is fostered through supportive
programs.'6 Nonetheless, if the process is delayed because of bureau-
cratic reasons, parental insouciance or judicial backlog, the time in
which the child remains within foster care lengthens.
If states are required to provide for termination of parental rights
through clear and convincing evidence, greater delay than under a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard is likely. That is, either more time
will be needed to demonstrate a parental refusal to rectify the situation
which has brought on the petition, or greater harm to the child will
have to be demonstrated to establish the basis for the petition. In either
instance, the best interest of the child is interpreted as less significant
than the parental presumption. Although many states have passed legis-
lation to prevent delay in such proceedings, the judicial system is over-
Act). See also hL at 290 (stating that entitlement for in-home care was S273 million in FY
1991, but S1.8 billion for foster care services for FY 1991. illustrating the difference in priori-
ties). But see Editorial, For Children in Foster Care, WASL POST. July 16, 1993. at A18 (edi-
torial recommends the House version of a federal bill that would provide states with SI.5 bil-
lion over five years for early intervention with problem families to keep them from needing
foster care).
Family income seems to be the single common denominator that predicts the presence of
an abusive or neglectful situation. "While poverty does not always or automatically lead to child
abuse and neglect, it can contribute to stress and a lack of emotional control that can result in
violence or an inability to meet a child's basic daily needs." BEYOND RHErORIC, supra note 14.
at 284. Drug use, particularly after 1985, is a significant factor, but poverty is the common
denominator of abuse and neglect. Although children living apart from their parents come from
all racial and ethnic groups-and all income groups--children from minority and single parent
families are over-represented. "At the end of fiscal year (FY) 1986, 49 percent of foster chil-
dren were minority, more than twice the proportion of minority children in the population na-
tionwide. Among black children in foster care, nearly 46 percent were from single-parent fami-
lies." Id. at 284-85.
Drug use among parents is the single greatest reason for the rise in foster care or institu-
tional care among children after 1985. "The growing number of troubled families-largely be-
cause of drug use-has overwhelmed the child welfare system." ld at 289.
164. For example, California provides that the child has been abandoned if the child has been
left without provision for identification for a period of six months; or by one parent in the care
and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any provision for the child's
support; or without communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the part of the
parent or parents to abandon the child. The failure to provide identification, failure to provide
support, or failure to communicate shall be presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon. CAL
Fmi. CODE § 7822(a)-(b) (Deering 1994). A child is dependent if he or she has been in out-of-
home placement under the supervision of the juvenile court, the county welfare department. or
other public or private licensed child-placing agency for a one-year period. CAL FAM. CODE §
7828 (Deering 1994).
12431994]
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
burdened, especially in certain geographical areas. The statutes,
therefore, even though good-intentioned, are rhetoric.165
The fact is that some children linger in foster care or in institutions
for extended periods of time. An estimated fourteen percent of foster
children stay in the system five years or more."6 For many of these
children, movement from one home to another is the norm, rather than
the exception.
Between 1983 and 1985, the number of children with multiple
placements in foster care rose from 16 percent to 30 percent.
Recent longitudinal studies of children in foster care found that
in New York 27 percent of the children reunited with their
families returned to placement some time later; in Illinois, the
comparable figure is just under 30 percent. 67
Children who continually return to the foster care system often lack
advantages that have been proven to be absolutely essential to healthy
development-a setting that provides continuity, and stable, caring rela-
165. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7870 (Deering 1994):
(a) It is the public policy of this state that judicial proceedings to declare a child
free from parental custody and control shall be fully determined as expeditiously as
possible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a proceeding to declare a child free
from parental custody and control . . . shall be set for trial not more than 45 days
after filing notification therefor and completion of service thereon in the manner pre-
scribed by law for service of civil process. The matter so set has precedence over all
other civil matters on the date set for trial.
(c) The court may continue the proceeding as provided in Section 7864 or Section
7871.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7864 (Deering 1994) provides:
The court may continue the proceeding for not to exceed 30 days as necessary to
appoint counsel and to enable counsel to become acquainted with the case.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7871 (Deering 1994) provides:
(a) A continuance may be granted only upon a showing of good cause. Neither a
stipulation between counsel nor the convenience of the parties is in and of itself a
good cause.
(b) Unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance, written
notice of a motion for a continuance of the hearing shall be filed within two court
days of the date set for the hearing, together with affidavits or declarations detailing
specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary.
(c) A continuance shall be granted only for that period of time shown to be neces-
sary by the evidence considered at the hearing on the motion. Whenever a continu-
ance is granted, the facts proven which require the continuance shall be entered upon
the minutes of the court.
166. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 14, at 287. Note that the Santosky children were in fos-
ter care for four and one-half years. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 773 (1982).
167. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 14, at 288.
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tionships with adults."r Significant numbers of children never reach
this goal, and if they do, it is only after prolonged periods of time have
elapsed. As Beyond Rhetoric notes:
Approximately 55 percent of children in foster care experience
two or more placements; 8 percent of children experience six or
more placements, in part because there are too few foster par-
ents trained and willing to care for troubled children and chil-
dren with special needs. In addition, foster children rarely have
just one caseworker who tracks their case and monitors their
progress. High rates of turnover among caseworkers make it
difficult for children to receive continuous personal attention
and may amplify their feelings of being lost in an uncaring
system.
69
In 1986, of all children leaving foster care, less than sixty percent
were either reunited with their families or placed with a parent, relative,
or other caregiver. Another seven percent were adopted or relinquished
for adoption. Approximately twenty percent either ran away,"O were
incarcerated, got married, died, were discharged to another public agen-
cy, or acquired by a legal guardian. Another eight percent reached age
eighteen and were no longer eligible for care."'
168. Id. at 287.
169. Id. at 288.
170. For an examination of foster care runaways, see Kevin M. Ryan, Stemming the Tide of
Foster Care Runaways: Due Process Perspective. 42 CAT1. U. L REV. 271-311 (1993).
171. BEYoND RHETORIc, supra note 14, at 288. No information is available for the remaining
six percent of children who left the foster care system in 1986. Id. Recommendations have been
made to extend foster care beyond age 18 to age 21. so as to redress the negative effects of
foster care placement. See i at 302. "In 1990. recognizing that many foster youth need addi-
tional support to complete their high school educations, to pursue postsecondary education and
training, and to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge to live successfully on their own.
Congress extended federal support for foster care services to youth up to age 21 at state op-
tion." Id.
Efforts to reduce the number of children who linger in foster care placement are evidenced
by some states' codified objectives. See, e.g., 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3130.13 (1991),
which states:
(a) A statewide goal of 1% reduction in the number of children in placement for 2
or more years is established for each of the next 7 years beginning in Fiscal Year
1983-1984 and concluding at the end of Fiscal Year 1989-1990 with a cumulative
reduction of 7%. This goal does not apply to individual counties.
(b) The steps taken to achieve this goal will include:
(1) Semiannual judicial or administrative review of the status of children in
placement
(2) Uniform monitoring and enforcement of the case planning and review
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E. Termination: The Final Solution
The constitutional protections afforded parents in termination pro-
ceedings outweigh the protections afforded the child. During the termi-
nation proceeding, the child is in a foster care environment that all too
often causes further harm to the child. 72 The child is likely to remain
in this harmful environment for at least five years pending parental re-
sponse to state initiatives. The likelihood of adoption decreases as the
child grows older." The child is not likely to be represented by legal
counsel, 74 and if he or she is represented by counsel, the counsel
could be representing the parents as well.' The fact of the matter is
that a clear and convincing standard places the child at a distinctive
disadvantage during the termination process.
In a clash of best interests between the parent and the child, it is
difficult to argue that the child is provided due process during termina-
tion proceedings. Proceedings subject to a clear and convincing standard
simply take too long. The child is traumatized and often suffers irrepa-
rable harm, the result of which is often tragic. Beyond Rhetoric de-
scribes the high rate of suicide among adolescents:
requirements established in this chapter.
(3) Increased emphasis on the development of adoption resources, including
the Adoption Cooperative Exchange (PACE) and the Pennsylvania Adoption
Assistance Program.
(4) Increased emphasis on services to children in their own homes.
Id.
172. The dissenting opinion in Santosky acknowledged the "often unstable world of foster
care." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 789 (1982).
173. The parent is provided with complete rights of appeal, and "no petition for adoption may
be heard until the appellate rights of the natural parents have been exhausted." CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7893(b) (3) (West Spec. Pamphlet 1993).
174. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7861. (West Spec. Pamphlet 1993) "The court shall consid-
er whether the interests of the child require the appointment of counsel. If the court finds that
the interests of the child require representation by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to
represent the child, whether or not the child is able to afford counsel." Id.
175. See, e.g., In re Kapesos, 360 A.2d 174, 177-78 (Pa. 1976); In re D., 547 P.2d 175, 179-
80 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (counsel for the child need not be appointed in all neglect proceedings,
only on a case-by-case basis as needed), cert. denied sub nom., C. v. F.F., 429 U.S. 907
(1976); State ex rel. Juv. Dep't of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527 P.2d 753, 756 (Or. Ct.
App. 1974) (when issue of parental unfitness to be adjudicated, potential for conflict between
interests of children and of both parents and state seems manifest), overruled by In re D.. 547
P.2d 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7860 (West Spec. Pamphlet 1993)
("The same counsel shall not be appointed to represent both the child and the child's parent.");
CAL. WELl=. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT, §§ 241-49
(McKinney 1983 & West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-821 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
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During the 1960s and 1970s, the rate at which adolescents took
their own lives doubled, from 3.6 to 7.2 deaths per 100,000,
while the rate for adults remained steady. By 1986, it had in-
creased another 30 percent, to 10.2 death per 100,000. Suicide
is now the second leading cause of death among adolescents,
after accidents. Unlike homicide, it is more common among
white teens than black teens, and white adolescents are by far
the highest-risk group, with a rate of 16 per 100,000.
76
Even if the child does not fall victim to suicide,
[i]t requires no citation of authority to assert that children who
are abused in their youth generally face extraordinary problems
developing into responsible, productive citizens. The same can
be said of children who, though not physically or emotionally
abused, are passed from one foster home to another with no
constancy of love, trust, or discipline."7
Surely these statistics support the proposition that in any termination
proceeding, the interest of the child is of sufficient importance to allow
termination to occur under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF DuE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR THE
CHILD
Although the parental presumption is deeply imbedded in our sys-
tem of jurisprudence, courts have recognized the rights of children in
some instances. Such recognition has become more widespread over the
past quarter century and can be attributed mainly to the changing nature
of the American family.
A. The Expanding Recognition of Childrens' Constitutional Rights
In 1967, the Court announced for the first time that the Constitution
afforded protection to children as well as to adults." Decisions by
176. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 14. at 35-36.
177. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 789 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
178. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone"). See also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth. 428 U.S.
52. 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors. as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."): Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:1209
the Court have established that children have equal protection
rights,'79  privacy rights,8 0  procedural due process protection," t
and a right to freedom of speech.'82
Recent cases have extended guarantees of privacy for individual
minors in areas that had been previously considered the inviolate realm
of family privacy and the parental presumption. In Carey v. Population
Services International,'83 for example, the Court found that a statute
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen
was unconstitutional because it intruded into a privacy right that could
only be regulated to vindicate a compelling state interest. Abortion is
another key area where changing definitions of family and privacy have
resulted in the elevated recognition of children's rights. This is particu-
larly true in cases involving parental notification. In all the cases ad-
dressing limits on parental notification, the Court has examined three
interests: the state's interest in the welfare of the pregnant minor; the
interest of the parents; and the interest of the family unit."8 The deci-
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (minor students are "persons" under the Constitution).
179. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
180. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (allowing contraceptives to be dis-
tributed to persons under the age of sixteen); see also Planned Parenthood of Utah v. Matheson,
582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (D. Utah 1983) (The absence of a procedure in statute whereby ma-
ture minors could demonstrate that parental notification was against their best interests unconsti-
tutionally infringed upon their right to decide whether to bear or beget children.).
181. The Warren Court established the child's right to certain procedural protection in the ju-
venile context. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court set aside a minor's conviction,
holding that even though a juvenile hearing need not "conform with all of the requirements of
a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing . . . [it] must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id. at 30 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The Burger Court extended a juvenile's right to due process. In In Re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 368 (1970), the Court held that minors may be found guilty only upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that minors may assert the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975), the Court recognized that a public school student
is entitled to notice and an informal hearing before being suspended from school. In Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977), the Court held that a child has a liberty interest in proce-
dural safeguards that would minimize risk of wrongful punishment. But the Court held further
that due process did not require advanced procedural safeguards before a school could adminis-
ter corporal punishment. lit at 682. But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 273-74, 277, 281
(1984) (Court held that preventive detention of a juvenile pursuant to a state statutory act does
not violate the Due Process clause because the detention is limited and serves to keep the juve-
nile in a more controlled environment than an adult prison).
182. The Court upheld a minor's right to protest the Vietnam war by wearing black arm
bands in school, stating that students "may not be confined to the expression of those senti-
ments that are officially approved." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
183. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
184. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990). In Hodgson, the Court held that the
state's requirement of notification to both of the pregnant minor's parents was not reasonably
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sions are tortuous, but all establish the privacy right of the child vis-a-
vis the parent.tss
In Bellotti v. Baird,'8 the Court held that a state may not require
a minor to obtain her parent's permission to get an abortion in all
cases. States are required to provide an alternative procedure by which
the minor may obtain an abortion without notifying the parent or re-
ceiving consent. The minor must be permitted to convince the court
that the abortion is in her best interest, and if successful, must be al-
lowed to obtain the abortion without notifying her parent.
The crux of Bellotti is that parental involvement in the decision of
whether or not to beget a child interferes with the "unique" nature and
"indelible" consequences involved in the fundamental right to choose an
abortion' 87 Thus, the Court allowed the child's decision to predomi-
nate over that of the parent and nullified the state statute.'
related to the state's interests. Id at 450.
185. See, eg., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health. 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding a stat.
ute requiring notification by the physician to at least one parent, unless the minor could prove
her maturity by clear and convincing evidence at a judicial proceeding).
186. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Justice Powell wrote for the majority, and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Justices Stevens. Marshall. Brennan and
Blackmun concurred, and Justice white dissented).
187. Id, at 642-43, see also H.L. v. Matheson. 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (Stevens, J.. concurring)
(the state has a fundamental and substantial "interest in protecting a young pregnant woman
from the consequences of an incorrect abortion decision").
188. Bellott, 443 U.S. at 651 (the Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent was nulli-
fied). In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). the Missouri statute, which had
required a minor to obtain parental consent before obtaining an abortion, was also nullified. In
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health. Inc., 462 US. 416, 441-42 (1983). overruled by
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Court found that the
local ordinance at issue did not meet constitutional safeguards in protecting minors. The statute
required minors seeking an abortion to secure either parental consent or a court order. Id at
439.
Other cases have upheld parental notification statutes. In H.L v. Matheson. 450 US 398
(1981), the Court upheld a Utah statute which required the attending physician to notify parents
of a minor, if possible, before performing an abortion. Notification was allowed, in part. be-
cause, in the Court's view, parents are counselors to their children and have a guidance respon-
sibility. Id. at 410.
Most states that require parental notification for a minor to receive an abortion also have a
judicial by-pass, whereby the pregnant minor may petition the court for a hearing in order for
the parental consent or notification not to be implemented. California has in place a statutory
scheme that requires the minor to receive the consent of one parent in order to get an abortion.
However, "[ihf the court finds that the minor is sufficiently mature and sufficiently informed to
make the decision on her own regarding an abortion, and that the minor has, on that basis.
consented thereto, the court shall grant the petition" for an abortion without pantal consenL
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (c) (1) (West 1994).
Some states, like Wyoming, have spelled out the level of proof necessary in order for the
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Attention to the child's best interest is not limited to the reproduc-
five context. Other cases have also recognized the child's best interest.
These include cases involving the name of the child, 8 9 interstate trav-
el by the custodial parent,"9° and parental neglect.' 9'
The recent change in judicial attitudes concerning the individuality
of children results in part from the acknowledgement of changing defi-
nitions of family, marriage, privacy, and the nature of "parenthood."
The past image of parents as depicted in The Brady Bunch, Leave It to
Beaver, or I Love Lucy is simply no longer a reality within a vast seg-
ment of the population. For instance, the definition of family as a union
of a man and woman united in a contract sanctioned by the state for
the purpose of procreation and the raising of children has been affected
by a series of cases that allow many of the benefits of marriage with-
court to determine whether the minor child has the requisite "maturity" and is adequately in-
formed about the abortion decision. Wyoming uses the clear and convincing standard. WYo.
STAT. § 35-6-118 (1993). Some states follow schemes similar to North Dakota's, which requires
the consent of both parents, with a judicial bypass. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1
(1991); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (Baldwin 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
112, § 12S (West 1983); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-53 (1993). Other states merely require
notification of parents, not consent. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-801 (Michie 1991): GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (Harrison 1990); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255 (Michie 1991);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-301 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1990). Still other states
require the notification of any adult relative, not necessarily the parents. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 1993). About half of the states have parental notification
and/or consent laws with judicial bypass provisions. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206
(1994).
189. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208. 1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding, upon rational basis
review, a statute providing that a child's welfare is served by bearing surname possessing a
connection with at least one legally verifiable parent), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032 (1991); In re
D.K.W. v. J.L.B.. 807 P.2d 1222. 1224 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (best interest of child born out
of wedlock served by denying motion by father to change child's surname from mother's to
his); Magiera v. Luera, 802 P.2d 6, 7-8 (Nev. 1990) (best interest of child born out of wedlock
to keep surname of the parent with whom she lives); Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d 454, 456
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (best interest of child of divorced parents to keep father's surname); Rio
v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (providing that the best interest of the child
should be the determining factor in what name the child should have).
190. See, e.g., Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 856 (NJ. 1988) (holding that a custodial
parent may move with the children of the marriage to another state as long as the move does
not interfere with the best interest of the children or the visitation rights of the non-custodial
parent).
191. Newmark v. Williams. 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991). Even though the court wrote that any
balancing test between the child's condition and state interference must begin with the parental
interest, id at 1115, the state can clearly intervene in the parent-child relationship where the
health and safety of the child is in jeopardy, id. at 1116. The child's interest takes precedence
under parens patriae.
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out the concomitant legal requirements or responsibilities."9 Explora-
tions into the new world of biology have also affected the definition of
family.
193
While it is certain that "[c]hildren do best when they have the
personal involvement and material support of a father and a mother and
when both parents fulfill their responsibilities to be loving provid-
ers .. .. [M]any children do not have two loving parents.""' Courts
overwhelmingly recognize this and are willing to intervene. Thus,
when families are so damaged that their children's health and
safety are in danger, society must intervene. Through both indi-
vidual and collective efforts, society must ensure that children's
basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and affection are met
when parents are unable to do so alone, and society must pro-
tect children who are at serious risk of physical or psychologi-
cal harm from adults within and outside their families. 95
In geographical areas where parental surrender, neglect and abuse
192. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971) (marriage is not. in itself. a significant
factor in the custody of children); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49. 53-54 (N.Y.
1989) (allowing two unmarried men who had been living in a rent controlled apartment for
eleven years to be included in the legislative definition of family); Marvin v. Marvin. 557 P.2d
106, 113 (Cal. 1976) (allowing for the possibility of contractual obligations to arise in a context
of non-marital sexual relationship where an express or implied promise is made); Reb-cca L
Melton. Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving
Definitions of "Family," 29 J. FAt. L. 497 (1991); Note. Looking for a Family Resemblance:
The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family. 104 HARV. L REv.
1640 (1991) (stating the elements of function in a family-like relationship include financial
commitment, exclusivity, the reliance members place on each other, the length of the relation-
ship, and presentation to the outside world).
Evidence of this trend is also buttressed by the popularity of domestic partnership legisla-
tion and business enactment. See, e.g., Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish. Note. A More
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances. 92 COUJM. L
REV. 1164 (1992); Vada Berger. Domestic Partnership Initiatives, 40 DEPAutL L REv. 417
(1991). But see Comment, The Wages of Sin: Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried
Couples, 25 U.C. DAvis L REv. 1055 (1992).
193. See, e.g., Janet L Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood. 40
UCLA L. REV. 637 (1993). The author describes the conflict between society's definition of
family and the emerging biological facts which, more often than not. -presume each individual
a separate, autonomous whole, free to negotiate the terms of life." Il at 694. Legal issues
touching on sexual orientation have also had an impact on the definition of family. See Devel-
opments in the Lav--Sexual Orientation and the Law. 102 HARV. L REV. 1508 (1989): Note,
Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Defini-
tion of Family, supra note 192.
194. BEYoND RHETORIC, supra note 14, at 66.
195. Id. at 71-72.
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are rampant, it may seem expedient to dismiss the claims of parents in
their children. This would, however, be a denial of due process to
parents, just as ignoring the interests of children is a denial of due
process. We must, therefore, balance the child's interest with that of the
parent. The due process rights of the child, however, always should be
the focus of the balance.
B. The Santosky Majority's Flawed Due Process Analysis
A person has an individual claim to due process protection when-
ever a state seeks to deprive him or her of life, liberty, or property.1
9 6
In conducting any due process analysis, courts address two issues: First,
whether or not the individual possesses a liberty or property interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 In making this determina-
tion, courts will look to see if an adverse outcome in the proceeding
would cause the individual to suffer a "grievous loss."t'8 Second. if
196. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No state
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... .
U.S. CO ST. amend. XIV, §1.
197. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). (The applicability of due pro-
cess depends not on the weight of the interest, but "whether the nature of the interest is one
within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Property interests include, for example, employment contracts if the public employee had a
reasonable expectation of continued employment. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564. 578 (1972) (holding that an employment contract for a fixed period of only one year does
not constitute a property interest). Liberty interests include not only fundamental constitutional
rights such as free speech, but also a person's reputation and future employment opportunities.
See Roth, 408 U.S. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). the Court indicated how expansive the definition of liberty interest could be:
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his [or her] own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men [or women].
Id.
198. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J.. concurring). For an example of a due process claim that did not result in pro-
tected conduct, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (deciding whether or not the Due
Process clause guarantees to homosexuals the right to engage in sodomy), and an article analyz-
ing the case, Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 747-52 & passim
(1989). For an example of a similar case analyzed under an equal protection claim, see Com-
monwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (holding that a criminal statute proscribing
consensual homosexual sodomy violates equal protection rights guaranteed by Kentucky Constitu-
tion absent showing of rational basis for punishing deviate sexual intercourse solely on basis of
sexual preference).
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the person possesses a protected property or liberty interest, the court
will determine what procedures are constitutionally mandated before the
state can deprive him or her of this fundamental interest.'"
In deciding if the existing state procedures are adequate to provide
due process, courts apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge.2° Mathews requires the weighing of three factors: the pri-
vate interests that will be affected by the state action; the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the private interest caused by the action at
issue; and the government's interest as evidenced by the statute.20'
In Santosky v. Kramer, the Mathews balancing test was directed
toward the rights of the parents, not the child.m In applying the fist
part of the test, the Court focused on the liberty interest of the par-
ents. 3 In applying the second part of the test, the Court emphasized
that the case was, in form, a contest between the state and the natural
parent.204 There was no mention of the child. Since the Court had al-
ready determined that the child's interest was subordinate to that of the
199. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer. 455 U.S. 745. 753 (1982) (delimiting two central ques-
dons: whether a natural parent is entitled to constitutional due process at a parental rights termi-
nation hearing, and if so, what process is due); Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. 481 (1972)
("Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.")
200. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
201. See id. at 335. In Mathews. the Court weighed the three factors and determined that the
state was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before terminating social security benefits.
Id. at 349. For an explanation of Mathews, see Brian A. Cufe. Note. Methods of Notice in
Termination of Parental Rights Hearings, 5 CONN. PROB. L. 317 (1991).
202. In Santosky, the Court wrote that "when the State moves to destroy weakened familial
bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." 455 U.S. at 753-54.
It can be argued that one reason why the Court's attention was directed towards parents
rather than towards the child was due to the Court's five-to-four decision in Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). one year earlier. Lassiter held that the Due Process
Clause does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status
termination proceeding. The majority in Santosky mentions that the "disparity between the
litigants' resources will be vastly greater in States where there is no statutory right to court-
appointed counsel:' Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763-64 & n.13. The point is clear- Parental rights are
a fundamental interest that demand due process consideration. Id. at 753. It should be noted.
however, that the Court was comfortable with a case-by-case analysis towards due process in
Lassiter while Santosky adopted a uniform burden of proof upon all states and in every parent-
child situation. If Santosky was a result of the Court's holding in Lassiter. it was a result that
imposed a strict and high level of proof that has factually affected the way in which children
are provided due process rights.
203. ld. at 759. The Court recognized the unique deprivation facing the parents in a termina-
tion proceeding. AL If the state prevails. drastic consequences follow: Parental rights will be
irrevocably terminated, id., and the parents would also suffer a loss of reputation. id. at 759-60.
Throughout the factfinding stage, the focus was on the parents, not the child. The Court
emphasized that no separate interest of the child exists at the factfmnding stage. Id.
204. Ld. at 762.
19941
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parent, it viewed the case as a contest solely between the parent and
the state.
In applying the third component of the Mathews test, the Court
examined the state's interest. The state had two interests in the termi-
nation proceeding: its parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare
of the child and its administrative and fiscal interests in reducing the
cost of such a proceeding."' The majority found that the state's inter-
est would be better served by a clear and convincing standard. 20 6 This
is because the state's goal in dealing with the child was to find a per-
manent home with a positive and nurturing environment. The natural
home of the child was deemed to be the presumptive place where this
could occur.20 7 Following this presumption, moreover, would result in
decreased costs and thus advance the state's administrative and fiscal
interests.
The Court's analysis with respect to the state's fiscal interest was
flawed. Raising the level of proof to clear and convincing actually
results in an increased fiscal and administrative burden.20 ' This is due
to the fact that the state must amass much more evidence to satisfy the
clear and convincing standard. During termination proceedings, the state
must bear the cost of foster care and maintain the services that are
designed to reunify the family. Consider these facts: Total expenditures
by the federal government on child welfare services have increased
from $536 million in 1981-one year before Santosky-to $2.385 bil-
lion in 1991;2" the estimated costs for state and local services for chil-
dren was $4.43 billion in 1989;2t ° overall, in the 1989 fiscal year,
state and local governments spent at least $180.3 billion (approximately
thirty-one percent of their budgets) on services and programs for chil-
dren.2 ' Even under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the
costs incurred by the state are enormous. The clear and convincing
standard increases these costs.
All three components of the Mathews test were utilized by the
205. Id. at 766.
206. Id. at 767.
207. Id. at 766-67.
208. See Hershkowitz, supra note 27. at 293 (discussion of the effects of elevated standards
of proof on the state's administrative and fiscal resources). The Santosky case itself also illus-
trates the administrative costs: seven proceedings were held concerning the disposition of the
children. 455 U.S. at 293 n.352.
209. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 14, at 308.
210. Id. at 315.
211. Id. at 316.
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majority in such a fashion that the due process rights of the child were
ignored. It is not that the due process analysis of Mathews itself was
applied incorrectly. The problem lies in the fact that the analysis was
directed solely toward the parents under the aegis of the parental pre-
sumption.
The dissent in Santosky reapplied Mathews to incorporate the inter-
est of the child. Justice Rehnquist properly recognized the fundamental
liberty interest of the parent in the custody and care of his or her
child. 12 But he also recognized the private interest of the child in the
speedy and proper outcome of the proceeding: "A stable, loving
homelife is essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-
being. 21 This private interest does not automatically subsist within
that of the parent.24 In fact, an error in the proceeding that results in
a failure to terminate parental rights has serious repercussions for the
child,15 as the facts of DeShaney illustrate. Accordingly, any consid-
eration of the private interest of the child must allow for a separate
determination without the parental presumption unduly inhibiting the
child's interest. This acknowledgement takes into consideration the
factual reality of abuse and neglect in America.
Once the dissent recognized that two private interests were involved
in the termination proceeding, it found that due process could be af-
forded to both the parent and the child by allowing the burden of proof
to be borne by each almost equally.2t6 Allowing for preponderance of
212. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, L., dissenting).
213. Id. at 788-89. Emphasis for this is found in BEYOND RHETORUC. supra note 14. at 71:
To grow and thrive, children need order. They need safe homes and neighbor-
hoods, free of violence and drugs. They need to feel confident that the adults in their
families and their communities will protect them, not prey upon them. Physical safety
and psychological security are essential to children's health, education, and overall
development. When their experience teaches them that they cannot depend on the
adults in their lives, children often grow hostile, distrustful, and angry. In failing to
insulate them from crime and violence, we are jeopardizing the futures of millions of
youngsters. Today's young victims are very likely to become tomorrow's armed rob-
bers, drug pushers, and murderers.
Id (citation omitted).
214. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788 n.13. 'This reasoning [subsisting the child's interest within
that of the parent] misses the mark. The child has an interest in the outcome of the factfinding
hearing independent of that of the parent." Id.
215. Id. If termination of parental rights does not occur when it rightfully should, the child
would suffer abuse and neglect. See, e-g., id. at 789 n.14. Or the child could languish in foster
care for a period of time too long to allow for adoption by a stable home. Id. at 789 n.15.
216. Id. at 791. Preponderance of the evidence allows for the burden of proof to be borne
almost equally between the two independent private interests. The parent still retains the pre-
sumption and also other due process remedies such as void for vagueness statutes that often
125519941
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the evidence decreased the risk to the child and still safeguarded the
parent's rights.
V. FEDERALISM
Implicit within the conflict between state procedures that incorporate
a standard of proof to terminate the rights of a parent and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution rejecting such procedures, is
the concept of federalism. It has long been the practice of the federal
courts to abstain from interfering with state solutions to domestic rela-
tions problems.217 This is a historical doctrine, more implicit within
the constitutional system of government than within any clearly eluci-
dated constitutional provision or federal statute.2" 8 In his dissent in
Santosky,219 Justice Rehnquist addressed this issue: "Even more worri-
some, [the majority] cavalierly rejects the considered judgement of the
New York legislature in an area traditionally entrusted to state care.
The Court thereby begins, I fear, a trend of federal intervention in state
family law matters which surely will stifle creative responses to vexing
problems."22
In mandating a clear and convincing standard in parental termina-
tion proceedings, the Santosky majority intruded upon the historical
ability of states to legislate creative and local solutions to problems
such as child abuse. Indeed, any change in the "poverty of hope '
will be best brought on by local actors crafting solutions to the partic-
ular problems endemic to each community. Federal micro-management
arise with termination statutes.
217. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2209-15 (1992) (discussing domestic re-
lations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction); Earl M. Malz, The State, the Family, and the
Constitution: A Case Study in Flawed Bipolar Analysis, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 489.
Domestic relations is "an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive prov-
ince of the States." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393. 404 (1975); see also Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988); De LaRama v. De LaRama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906); Simms v.
Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858).
218. "Historically, the right to regulate the relationship between parents and children has been
one of the most closely-guarded prerogatives of state government; thus, any effort by the Court
to restrict local autonomy in this area faces formidable federalism-related obstacles." Maltz,
supra note 217, at 490-91. The true basis for this exception to federal jurisdiction is stated in a
recent decision: "Because we are unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been recog-
nized for nearly a century and a half .... " Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2210 (concerning
whether a federal court has jurisdiction over alleged torts committed by a former husband of
petitioner against petitioner's children).
219. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 791.
221. BEYOND RHEroRiC, supra note 14, at 5.
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is not the solution.
Two justifications underlie state autonomy in matters of domestic
relations. First, the Court has interpreted the federal statute conferring
diversity jurisdiction to exclude federal court jurisdiction over divorce
and other cases.'m "Absent a contrary command of Congress, the fed-
eral courts properly should abstain, at least from diversity actions tradi-
tionally excluded from the federal courts, such as those seeking divorce,
alimony, and child custody." ' Second, leaving states free from feder-
al control allows them to experiment with different approaches to the
same problems. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country." 4
Although states have not always risen to the challenge of devising
creative solutions to domestic relations problems, "leaving the States
free to experiment with various remedies has produced novel approach-
es and promising progress."'  States have even "developed special-
ized courts and institutions in family matters, while Congress and the
federal courts generally have not done so."' 6 Accordingly, only when
a domestic relations statute contains a clear constitutional violation
should the federal courts interfere with a state's resolution of domestic
relations matters.?7
222. See Hershkowitz, supra note 27. at 248 n.21. The Judiciary Act of 1789 has been judi-
cially interpreted to include only that subject matter over which the English court of chancery
had jurisdiction when the United States became a nation. Id. Since the court of chancery did
not have jurisdiction over divorce, neither do the federal courts. Ld. Early cases signaled this ap-
proach: "Ve disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon subject
of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as
an incident to a divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board." Barber v. Barber. 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582. 584 (1858). In 1890, however, the Court made it clear that the Lack of federal
jurisdiction extended to all areas of domestic relations: "Th whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to
the laws of the United States,' In re Bun-us. 136 U.S. 586. 593-94 (1890).
223. Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2221 (Blackmun. J.. concurring).
224. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis. J., dissenting).
225. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 771 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting). Examples of state innovations
would be: Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, see. eg.. OR. REV. STAT. § 108.725 (1990);
goodwill as a marital asset, see, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson. 576 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1991); the
disposition of a cryogenicaly-preserved product of in vitro fertilization, see. e.g.. Davis v. Davis.
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. C. 1259 (1993): fimding
that the state homosexual sodomy statute was unconstitutional under the state constitution. see,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
226. Ankenbrandt, 112 S. CL at 2221 (Blackmun. J., concurring).
227. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 771. See also Hershkowitz. supra note 27. at 249: Allan D. Vestal
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By imposing a clear and convincing standard, the Santosky Court
preempted the procedures utilized by numerous states. Many such pro-
cedures were enacted by states in an effort to promote "fundamental
fairness" to all parties involved-including the interests of the child-in
the context of other statutory procedures. In New York, for example,
the legislature believed that a preponderance of the evidence standard
provided fairness to all the parties: parents, children and the state. The
New York scheme did not contain a clear constitutional violation.
As Justice Rehnquist concluded in his dissent in Santosky:
New York's adoption of the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard reflects its conclusion that the undesirable conse-
quences of an erroneous finding of parental unfitness-the un-
warranted termination of the family relationship-is roughly
equal to the undesirable consequence of an erroneous finding of
parental fitness-the risk of permanent injury to the child either
& David L. Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41
MINN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1956).
The National Commission on Children has recommended three community-level programs
which are essential to the domestic relations exception:
(I) Promoting child development and healthy family function through locally
controlled and coordinated, community-based family support networks that offer access
and referrals to a broad range of services, including health and mental health care,
education, recreation, housing, parenting education and support, employment and train-
ing, and substance abuse prevention and treatment.
(2) Assisting families and children in need in order to strengthen and preserve
families that voluntarily seek help before their problems become acute. Human service
programs, including health and mental health, juvenile services, substance abuse pro-
grams, education, and economic and social supports, must collaborate to provide pre-
vention and early intervention services that offer practical solutions to problems faced
by families in crisis.
(3) Protecting abused and neglected children through more comprehensive child
protective services, with a strong emphasis on efforts to keep children with their
families or to provide permanent placement for those removed from their homes.
BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 14. at 295-96 (emphasis omitted).
In particular, when babies are abandoned at birth and when repeated attempts to reunify
older children and parents have failed, the programs recommend that the adoption process
should be streamlined to expedite placement of children in permanent, stable families. Id. at
300-01.
As federalism is designed to foster such programs, especially within the geographically
diverse economic and cultural fabric of American states, anything less than a clear constitutional
violation impedes the recommendations of the National Commission on Children and the best
interest of the child. The Court's intrusion into state domestic relations in Santosky was unwar-
ranted and not in the best interest of children.
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by return of the child to an abusive home or by the child's
continued lack of a permanent home. Such a conclusion is well
within the province of state legislatures.2
The New York scheme in place at the time of Santosky incorporat-
ed the following requirements to safeguard the rights of the parties
involved: (1) that an attorney be appointed to represent the parents; (2)
that multiple hearings be held; (3) that there be a determination that the
parents are present at the hearings and were served with the petition;
(4) that only material and relevant evidence be submitted; (5) that tem-
porary removal be reviewed every eighteen months; (6) that the same
judge preside throughout; (7) that parents be notified twenty days be-
fore the hearing; (8) that the state make diligent efforts to assist the
parents to develop a relationship with the child; (9) that the termination
proceeding result in an independent evaluation of the material and rele-
vant evidence; and (10) that the parents be given a right to appeal with
the assistance of state appointed counsel. '  Surely the imposition of
such safeguards prevented the possibility of a clear constitutional viola-
tion.
In and of itself, the standard of proof necessary to terminate paren-
tal rights can not be the reason for a clear constitutional violation. As
the Santosky dissent noted, "[b]y holding that due process requires
proof by clear and convincing evidence the majority surely cannot mean
that any state scheme passes constitutional muster so long as it applies
that standard of proof."' 0 Something more, therefore, must be present
before the unique necessity for federal jurisdiction over a matter clearly
within the realm of domestic relations is warranted. By imposing a
clear and convincing standard, the Santosky Court ignored the historical
tradition of abstaining from interference in state domestic relations law.
In so doing, the Court inflicted a serious blow to our federalist system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Introduction to this Article suggested that the question present-
ed often presupposes the answer given. If the question presented con-
tinues to be whether parents have a clear and convincing due process
claim to the custody of their children, the best interest of the child will
not merit constitutional, practical, or honest consideration. The present
228. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788 n.13 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
229. Id. at 776-80.
230. IM. at 772.
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status of the American family, however, demands that we ask a new
question: In a clash between the private interests of parents and the pri-
vate interests of children, does the Due Process Clause demand that
states use a preponderance of the evidence standard in terminating
parental rights? The answer is yes, because such a standard of evidence
rejects the notion that the best interest of the child subsists within that
of the parent.
Within certain easily defined geographical areas of the country, an
alarming number of children are being victimized by parents who abuse
or neglect them. A rigid adherence to the parental presumption obliter-
ates the rights of these children. While some deference to parental
rights is warranted, too much deference translates into suffering on the
part of children.
Children suffer because of the delay existent in termination pro-
ceedings. Children suffer when they are returned to parents who fail to
provide for the child and continue to persist in the abuse and neglect
that brought on the termination proceedings. Children suffer from the
inability of states to fashion creative approaches to child care due to
unwarranted encroachment by the federal government. In order to re-
duce the suffering of children at the hands of abusive parents, we must
reckon with reality and allow states to address the best interest of the
child through the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in
termination proceedings.
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